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This thesis examined the status of all-source fused intelligence
support within the United States Marine Corps. Deficiencies in this
area were identified in the late 1980s and the Marine Corps created
two new organizations dedictated to the production of all-source
fusion intelligence: the service level Marine Corps Intelligence
Activity and three MAGTF All-Source Fusion Centers. Despite the
creation of these organizations, a number of factors continue to
complicate and inhibit Marine Corps Intelligence from providing
more than rudimentary all-source, fused, tailored intelligence
support to Marine Corps and joint operating forces. A survey
questionnaire returned by nearly half of all Marine Corps intelligence
officers, and research into these new all-source fusion organizations,
determined that continued manning and structure deficiencies,
inadequate training and education, and problems with experience
level and assignments are the main problems. The Marine Corps is
taking active steps to correct these deficiencies, but with downsizing
and budget cutbacks, all-source, fused intelligence support by
Marines to Marines, may remain more a goal than a reality.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In Vietnam, Beirut, Desert Storm, and many other
operational commitments, Marine Corps intelligence learned the
value of ail-source fusion analysis. Despite those lessons,
all-source, fused, tailored intelligence, particularly at the
operational/tactical level, remains a Marine Corps objective,
but not a reality.
Three primary areas significantly impede Marine Corps
capabilities to produce all-source, fused, tailored
intelligence: structure, organization, and manning combined;
training and education; and experience level and assignments.
The Marine Corps decision in the late 1980s, to create
organizations and structure to focus all-source fusion
intelligence analysis at two levels has paid partial
dividends. Commandant Alfred M. Gray's vision for a service
level all-source fusion center has largely been realized with
the establishment and continued growth of the Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity. This organization, thanks to resource
investment and civilian analyst billets--a reflection of the
Marine Corps' priorities--has developed a capability to
accomplish its mission and tasks. Unfortunately, the MCIA is
not in a position, physically or within an operational chain
Vll
of command, to provide direct all-source fused, tailored
intelligence to deployed Marine forces.
This leaves the MEF level MAGTF All-Source Fusion Centers
(MAFCs), specifically created to serve this operational
intelligence function, as the organizations of choice to
accomplish all-source fusion intelligence analysis support for
Marine operating forces. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has
not made the proper investment in these organizations in terms
of manning--both in numbers and in quality and experience
level of the personnel assigned. This has been, and continues
to be, the most significant reason why all-source fused,
tailored, intelligence has not been produced by Marines for
Marines in the quantity and quality desired or expected.
With or without additional manning and structure, the
Marine Corps must do a better job of training and educating
intelligence personnel in the art of intelligence analysis and
all-source fusion. All-source fusion intelligence analysis
must become the focus of all intelligence training. However,
all-source fusion training must be continuous and realistic,
both in garrison and in exercises.
Despite short term Marine Corps initiatives to alleviate
intelligence officer personnel shortages, continued shortages
of experienced intelligence personnel assigned to the FMF will
continue to dictate an almost exclusive focus on processing
Vlll
combat information versus production of finished intelligence
reflecting well reasoned, all-source, fused analysis.
There are also not enough experienced intelligence
personnel working in analysis billets. An effort must be made
to identify key analyst billets within che Marine Corps,
starting with the MAFCs . Then, better efforts must be made to
fill these billets with personnel specifically experienced in
all-source fusion analysis, as well as with other intelligence
personnel with pertinent area expertise/ familiarity
.
Unfortunately, the problems identified in this thesis are
for the most part symptomatic of the many larger problems
facing Marine Corps intelligence in general. The Marine Corps
is aware of the many deficiencies within the intelligence
field and is aggressively tackling the problems head on.
The Marine Corps has always prided itself on doing more
with less. This does not work when it comes to all-source
fusion analysis support to Marine and joint operating forces.
The Marine Corps must make a much greater investment in
people--in terms of numbers, training, and assignments--if
all-source fused, tailored, intelligence support by Marines
for Marines and joint operating forces is to be improved.
Without that investment, Marine Corps intelligence
organizations and personnel will continue to operate as they
have, and all-source, fused, tailored intelligence will remain




Although the nature of uncertainty has changed, "and
perhaps moving to a higher and more complicated plateau,
it nevertheless remains the very essence of war as in the
past .
...not all of the information received is correct nor
can it always be decoded, analyzed or interpreted in time.
The ever-present possibility of deception also casts doubt
upon all the data received, since no dependable method of
exposing deception has been, or can be, devised. The
staggering increase in the volume of information obtained
means that if anything, more, not less, time is needed for
processing today; it means that this plethora of
information may lead to a higher incidence of
contradictory data and at times to the paralysis of
command
.
Michael I. Handel 1
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND/BEIRUT BOMBING
At the end of the Vietnam War twenty years ago, the most
common self -analysis by members of the intelligence community
(Marine Corps) following. tours in Vietnam condemned members of
the community for failing to have recognized the immediacies
of the situation relative to the collection and analysis (my
emphasis) of timely intelligence information." Consequently,
in the ensuing years, a number of initiatives were undertaken
Michael I. Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations ,
(London: Frank Cass & Company, Limited, 1990), 5.
~R.B. MacKenzie, Captain, USMC, "Intelligence Starts at
the Top," Marine Corps Gazette , 57 (July 1973): 40.
within the Marine Corps in an attempt to correct institutional
deficiencies in intelligence.
One of the most significant initiatives intended to
correct Vietnam era intelligence problems, was the opening up
of the intelligence military occupational specialty (MOS 0202)
to unrestricted line officers as a primary MOS. Until the
late 1970s, Marine Corps intelligence was accomplished by
Limited Duty Officers (LDOs) and by other unrestricted
officers carrying intelligence as a secondary MOS. The
opening up of the field to unrestricted officers, succeeded in
conveying a new sense of legitimacy to the field, and most
certainly elevated the amount of visibility and attention the
occupational field received within the Marine Corps.
In the early 1980s, the age old debate, last visited in
the wake of Vietnam, on how best to provide intelligence
support to forward deployed Marines heated up again. At that
time, two primary organizations were responsible for producing
"tailored, " "fused" intelligence products in support of Marine
Corps units. Manned by both Marine officer and enlisted
intelligence personnel, they were Fleet Intelligence Center
Pacific (FICPAC) and Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and
Atlantic (FICEURLANT) . As a result of the debate, the Marine
Corps took steps to improve "tailored," "fused" intelligence
support to Marines deployed to the Mediterranean. These
included consideration of the establishment of a Power
2
Projection ( P2 ) Cell at Fleet Ocean Surveillance and
Information Facility (FOSIF) Rota, Spain. As a part of this
initiative, several Marine Corps intelligence billets (officer
and enlisted) were created at FOSIF Rota to enhance
intelligence support to Marine units deployed to the
Mediterranean. These, and other organizations responsible for
providing intelligence to U.S. forward deployed forces in the
Mediterranean, came under scrutiny following the tragic 23
October 1983 terrorist bombing attack of the 24th Marine
Amphibious Unit (MAU) Battalion Landing Team (BLT)
Headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon. The bombing took the lives
of 241 U.S. military personnel and in so doing, forced the
Marine Corps to take a hard look at all aspects of
intelligence support. This included the types and amount of
raw information and intelligence related to the incident, and
the degree to which all-source fusion of that information and
intelligence did or did not occur in support of the MAU and
the BLT.
The Long Commission report on this bombing included a
finding of "inadequate intelligence" --specif ically, that the
Marine commander in Beirut "was not provided with timely
intelligence, tailored to his specific operational needs." 3
3U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the U.S. POD
Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act,
October 23, 1983 ([Washington, D.C.j: U.S. Department of
Defense, 20 December 1983), 66.
And, while another finding was that support to conventional,
tactical military requirements received praise from many in
the administrative and operational chains of command, one
specific finding had a particular impact on all-source fusion
analysis support within the U.S. Marine Corps. That finding,
more specifically a recommendation, was that significant
attention must be given by the entire U.S. intelligence
structure to purging and refining masses of generalized
information into intelligence analysis useful to small unit
ground commanders. 4 The report stated emphatically that,
"there was no institutionalized process for the fusion of
intelligence disciplines into an all-source fusion support
mechanism.""' In the aftermath of this post mortem, a serious
reexamination of how best to support deployed U.S. forces with
all-source fused intelligence analysis support occurred at all
levels within the intelligence community.
B. C4I2 CONCEPT AND START OF AN ALL-SOURCE FUSION CAPABILITY
Within the Marine Corps, this examination took a number of
years, and the arrival of General Alfred M. Gray as Commandant
in 1988, before institutional changes required to develop a
true all-source fusion intelligence capability were made.
Early in 1988, a group of Marine officers was assigned by
4 Ibid., 65.
s Ibid.
General Gray to study the structure of the operating forces
and recommend changes that would enhance the warfighting
potential of the various Marine Air Ground Task Forces
(MAGTFs) . This initiative aggressively restructured and
refocused the Marine Corps to face the challenges of the 1990s
--away from East-West confrontation and toward emerging
threats in the Third World. In the Winter 1989-1990 American
Intelligence Journal , General Gray outlined several decisions
based on proposals from this study group and which affected
Marine Corps intelligence. He said, "we are doing what we can
to improve tailored intelligence for Marine Corps' needs at
both the strategic and tactical levels." General Gray listed
three major initiatives directly affecting intelligence:
* At Headquarters Marine Corps, he combined the Intelligence
Division with the C4 Division to form the Command, Control,
Communications, Computer, Intelligence and Interoperability
(C4I2) Department under a Major General, Assistant Chief of
Staff.
* At Quantico, Virginia, he created a service-level
intelligence center within the Marine Corps Combat
Development Command (MCCDC)
.
* In the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) he formed Surveillance,
Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Groups (SRIGs)/
On 9 September 1988, Brigadier General J. D. Beans,
Director of Marine Corps C4I2 made an office call on General
bAlfred M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, "Global
Intelligence Challenges for the 1990' s, " American Intelligence
Journal , 11 (Winter 1989 - 1990): 3.
7 Ibid.
Gray during which General Gray passed down his comments and
provided general guidance on C4I2 and the SRI Group. In a 13
September 1988 memorandum to the Assistant Commandant
outlining the key points of his office call with the
Commandant, General Beans said, when discussing the creation
of a service level intelligence center, the guidance from the
Commandant was clear: "Quantico should be the model of
all-source fused and tailored intelligence." 6 At the
operational and tactical levels, General Gray's initiative to
enhance intelligence capabilities was already in motion.
The Commandant had directed the establishment of an SRI
Group in each of the three Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary
Forces (MEFs) . The SRI Groups consolidated all of the
intelligence collection, production, and dissemination
capabilities into one organization. Prior to the formation of
the SRI Groups, the collection and production assets of each
MEF were scattered among the major subordinate commands which
complicated the coordinated employment of the various assets.
The Commandant's Force Structure Study Group also recommended
that an intelligence company be created under the SRI Group to
consolidate these eight intelligence units of the MEF. In
8J.D. Beans, Brigadier General, USMC, Director, Command
and Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence and
Interoperability (C4I2) Department, Headquarters U.S. Marine
Corps memorandum to Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps,
5000 over C4I2 4/997 dated 13 Sep 88, TMsS [photocopy], p. 2.
addition to the eight existing intelligence-related units
within the MEF, two new units were to be created--a tactical
deception platoon and an all-source analysis center (ASAC) (my
emphasis) , later renamed Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
all-source fusion center (MAFC)
.
9
The ASAC was intended as a direct answer to earlier
criticism from various sources, including Congress, that at
the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) level the Marine Corps did not
possess the ability to process intelligence derived from all
available sources and provide a product to a supported
commander. As mentioned earlier, the Commandant and the Force
Structure Study Group had identified fused all-source
intelligence support to MAGTF commanders as a critical part of
preparing the Marine Corps for operations in the 1990s. With
their unique power projection capabilities, MAGTFs possessed
equally unique intelligence requirements that may or may not
have been adequately addressed by a theater commander's
intelligence architecture. 10 So the challenge was to create
a dedicated FMF organization to provide all-source fusion.
At the MEF level, the ASAC and its derivative detachments
in support of smaller MAGTFs were intended to provide to the
9Brendan P. Ryan, Major, U.S. Marine Corps, "MAGTF All
Source Fusion Center," Marine Corps Gazette 74 (August 1990)
60, 61.
10Ibid., 61.
commander an organic capability to fuse intelligence received
from all available sources. The ASAC would focus on the
difficult process of making sense out of disparate reports,
screen out the irrelevant and distractors, and provide a
streamlined intelligence product that focused on the immediate
needs of the supported commander. :: (The official mission,
function, and organization of these all-source fusion centers
is discussed in Chapter III.)
On 1 February 1988, the Marine Corps Intelligence Center,
the service level organization, was officially activated with
initial operational capability (IOC) achieved in January
1992. :2 The MAFCs followed soon after. On 28 September
1988, the Commandant of the Marine Corps activated the 2d
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group under II
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) at Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina effective 1 October 1988. n Eight months later, the
2d MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center (MAFC) was activated at the
same location under 2d Intelligence Company of the 2d SRI
Group. On 1 June 1989, it became the first all-source fusion
n Ibid. "Smaller MAGTFs" referred to Marine Expeditionary
Brigades (MEBs) and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs)
.
12Rick Raftery, Major, U.S. Marine Corps, Operations
Officer, interview by author, 24 March 1993, Handwritten
notes, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Quantico, Virginia.
:3Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps Bulletin
5450 Activation of 2d Surveillance, Reconnaissance and
Intelligence Group (SRI Group) , 282020Z Sep 88.
8
center in the Marine Corps, albeit still in its formative
stage. The 2d SRIG was followed by the 1st SRIG with its MAFC
under I MEF at Camp Pendleton, California in October 1989, and
finally by the 3rd SRIG with its MAFC under III MEF in
Okinawa, Japan in October 1990.
Any new organization takes time to develop a full
operational capability, particularly those created from
scratch as were the MAFCs . Unfortunately for the fledgling
MAFCs, a major challenge to their concept and vision lay just
around the corner.
The first major test of the Marine Corps' newly developing
all-source fusion analysis capability was Operation Desert
Shield/Storm from August 1990 to February 1991. Although not
fully manned, the 1st MAFC deployed in August in support of I
MEF and was augmented by the 2d MAFC in early January 1990.
Together, with some additional augmentation, the two MAFCs
formed the Analysis and- Production Section of I MEF for
Operation Desert Storm. The tactical intelligence produced by
this section received noteworthy praise at the national
level. 14 This assessment was not shared by Brigadier General
:4Charles E. Allen, National Intelligence Officer for
Warning, National Intelligence Council, Director of Central
Intelligence, memorandum to General Alfred M. Gray, Commandant
of the Marine Corps, NIC 00272/91 dated 19 March 1991, TMs
[photocopy] with forwarding cover letter from John F.
McCreary, Director, National Warning Staff to LtCol B.E. Brunn
USMC 3 July 1991 NWS/U-0030-91 TMsS [photocopy]
.
Paul K. Van Riper, who traveled throughout Southwest Asia from
early January to early March 1991. Observing all aspects of
deployed Marine forces in the theater, he noted in the June
1991 Marine Corps Gazette :
The weakest area I observed was tactical intelligence.
Shortcomings existed at all levels, though the most
significant were at the higher echelons. . .When it comes to
analysis of information to produce useable intelligence,
we are particularly weak. 15
While there has been much internal debate within the Marine
Corps intelligence community over the nature of General Van
Riper 's observations and conclusions relative to Marine Corps
intelligence in the Gulf, and whether the failing relative to
analysis was measurable or simply a matter of perception, it
remains a fairly widespread belief within the Marine Corps
intelligence community that there were and are serious
deficiencies in our ability to conduct all-source fused
intelligence analysis of the type demanded by the situations
in Vietnam, Beirut, Desert Storm and all other contingency
commitments in between and since.
C. THESIS PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND ORGANIZATION
This thesis identifies many of the complexities and
problems which inhibit Marine Corps intelligence from
15Paul K. Van Riper, Brigadier General, USMC,
"Observations During Operation Desert Storm, " Marine Corps
Gazette 75 (June 1991) : 58.
10
providing all-source fused intelligence analysis support to
Marine Corps, and potentially to joint operating forces.
Despite the creation and continued organizational existence of
three MAGTF all-source fusion centers within the Fleet Marine
Force, as well as the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (nov;
redesignated the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity) at the
service level, all-source fusion intelligence analysis support
provided by Marines for Marines remains more a goal than a
reality.
This thesis looks at the ongoing organizational
initiatives within the DOD intelligence community as they
affect all-source analysis support to Marine forces, but more
specifically at the many other factors which continue to
complicate and inhibit significant progress in developing a
true, all-source fusion analysis capability within Marine
Corps intelligence at the operational and tactical levels.
Chapter II provides some background on the nature of
intelligence analysis in general, including definitions of
terms used throughout the rest of the thesis related to
intelligence analysis and all-source fusion. A discussion and
general framework is necessary to better understand the impact
of the major factors affecting all-source fusion intelligence
analysis covered in subsequent chapters.
11
These factors, covered in Chapters III through V
respectively, are Structure, Organization and Manning;
Training and Education; and Experience Level and Assignments.
The 2d MAFC, as the first activated and longest operating
MAFC serves throughout to provide case study examples. 1 "3
Discussions of national, theater and service level all-source
fusion organizations, initiatives, and procedures are
restricted in scope to how they are perceived to be affecting
support to Marine forces
.
Throughout each chapter appear the results of selected
questions related to the chapter topic from a questionnaire
survey sent to all 340 Marine 0202 and 0205 intelligence
officers between the rank of Warrant Officer and Lieutenant
Colonel on active duty in April 1993. The questionnaire,
administration details, and summarized results are attached at
the Appendix. 147 of 310 officers believed to have received
the survey responded for an overall 47 percent response rate.
16The author was the Of f icer-in-Charge of the 2d MAFC from
August 1990 until June 1992 and deployed with the unit to
Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Discussions with other OICs
and personnel of the other two MAFCs during the same time
period and since reinforces most if not all of the author's
experiences with the 2d MAFC, substantiating use of the 2d
MAFC experiences as illustrative examples throughout. The
author had access to the entire 2d MAFC historical file during
the production of this thesis. When citing a specific example
for which there is no ready documentary evidence, the author
will cite the example from the memory of his experience. If
unsure whether the example applies to the other MAFCs, the
author will so state.
12
Chapter VI is a summary of conclusions and implications for
the future of all-source fusion intelligence analysis in the
Marine Corps. While beyond the scope of this thesis, some




Intelligence restructuring, underway at all levels within
the Department of Defense, is intended to streamline
intelligence support and avoid duplication of effort. Nowhere
is this more important than in the production of all-source
fused analysis support to deployed U.S. forces. More often
than not, these deployed forces will include U.S. Marines.
Since World War II, there have been over 200 situations
requiring the use of U.S. forces; roughly 85 percent of which
required the employment of Marines, and virtually all were in
the Third World.'* As the past two years have demonstrated,
there is every indication that this level of commitment will
continue, if not increase in the foreseeable future. The
Marine Corps is the nation's smallest service yet must
maintain a global focus. Of 191 sovereign countries
identified a year ago in the Marine Corps' Mid-Range Threat
Assessment, 115 countries remain of potential interest to the
17Gray, 4.
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Marine Corps. 18 All traditional Marine Corps power
projection and forward presence missions as well as the recent
focus on peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian assistance,
and counternarcotics only further strain our limited
intelligence resources.
The Marine Corps has traditionally done extremely well at
the tactical level of operation. Because of this, the Marine
Corps has tended to focus on the tactical aspects of war to
the neglect of operational aspects. 19 As demonstrated by the
scope of operations in the Persian Gulf, and as the Marine
Corps embarks into the arena of joint operations, not only as
a component, but as the Joint Task Force Command Element
nucleus as it was for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, the
scope of Marine Corps doctrinal thinking and actual
involvement is broadening to the operational level. As stated
in current Marine Corps doctrine:
Operational intelligence must reflect the broader
perspective of operations. As the operational level of
war is less a matter of actual fighting and more a matter
lbHeadquarters , U.S. Marine Corps, Mid-Range Threat 1992-
2002, Part II , (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, Director of Intelligence, 1992), 2-1. Countries of
potential interest met a criteria for "expeditionary" status--
that a country must have either a seacoast (of any length) , or
be within the range of assault support aviation operating from
a naval platform.
19Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force
Manual 1-1, Campaigning (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, 1990), 87.
14
of schemes and intentions, operational intelligence
focuses less on current combat capabilities and more on
forecasting future enemy capabilities, intentions, and
options. Because the operational level of war has as its
aim the attainment of a strategic objective, operational
intelligence must provide insight into the strategic
situation and all factors, military and otherwise, " that
influence it . 20
The U.S. Armed Forces and the national intelligence
community have invested enormous resources in harnessing the
capability of modern technology to provide intelligence to the
operator. The challenge for joint force commanders normally
is not to amass more data but to extract and organize the
knowledge most useful for overcoming the enemy."" Clearly,
the requirement for an all-source fusion intelligence analysis
capability exists. The question is, does the Marine Corps
have that capability? Again, this thesis examines this very
question
.
The Marine Corps will continue to find itself at the Low
Intensity Conflict (LIC) end of the spectrum of conflict. The
unique nature of intelligence requirements in a LIC
environment have been well documented. They include a
necessary focus at a lower, grass-roots level. Enemy order of
20Ibid., 75.
21Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication
1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces
,
(Washington, D.C.:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991), 34.
15
battle and data bases must also be generated to a lower
level. 22 Beirut is the most obvious example, but certainly
U.S. Marine involvement in Operations Just Cause in Panama and
Restore Hope in Somalia reinforced this understanding-.' The
Commander of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) included
in his lessons learned from the Marine noncombatant evacuation
(NEO) of American citizens and protection of the U.S. Embassy
in Monrovia, Liberia during Operation Sharp Edge from June to
August 1991, the following:
In combination, the flood of message traffic from various
intelligence organizations, and the paucity of specific
information responsive to the commander's requirements,
suggested the need for a single focal point capable of
providing collection management and all-source analysis
services to the commander and his staff. Neither Embassy
resources nor organic resources (including Navy resources
afloat) were adequate to the task of managing
multidisciplinary collection by external agencies, and
fusing the flood of raw data into timely useful
reports . ~ 3
Intelligence support in a LIC environment cannot be
effective without all-source fusion analysis.
Finally, across all spectrums of warfare and other
military involvement, as stated by the Commander of 22nd
22James D. Beans, Brigadier General, USMC, "Marine Corps
Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflicts," Signal , 14 (March
1989) : 29.
23Robert David Steele, USMC Management Analyst,
Intelligence Lessons Learned From Recent Expeditionary
Operations
,
(Special Report for C4I2 Department, Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps, 3 August 1992): 9.
16
MEU, information overload can quickly become a problem.
Current intelligence collection systems can produce five
or ten times as much data in the same amount of time as
their counterparts of just ten years ago (Beirut), which
in turn produced information five to ten times as quickly
as their predecessors ten years before that (end of
Vietnam) . This raw information can be invaluable, but
only if the intelligence community can transform it into
useful intelligence. 24 All the raw information in the
world, together with an ability to disseminate large
amounts of data/information down to the lowest tactical
level is an effort in futility if at some point, the
information is not effectively, accurately, and in a
timely manner, filtered and synthesized into
" intelligence .
"
As the Marine Corps downsizes and reorganizes to meet
fiscal constraints, while at the same time facing an ever
complex and unstable world situation, Marine Corps
intelligence responsibilities are growing, while
capabilities to filter, tailor, and fuse all-source
information and/or intelligence in support of Marine and
Joint operating forces are seriously hampered by many
:4Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic
Intelligence for American National Security (Princeton, Mew
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 16.
17
factors. First, however, a basic examination of the
complex task of intelligence analysis and some related
definitions provide the necessary framework for a broader
understanding of the impact these factors have in
inhibiting all-source fusion efforts in the Marine Corps.
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II. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND ALL-SOURCE FUSION
It is the intelligence officer's job to determine what the
enemy is doing, not merely to disseminate the many scraps
of information, and require the recipient to draw the
conclusions
.
LtCols Robert R. Glass and Phillip B. Davidson-
However much information is available, we do not have all
that might be possible to obtain; i.e., the information is
incomplete , often on matters of considerable importance in
the problem at hand. Usually, the items of information,
taken alone or in the aggregate, will be inconclusive in
the sense that the information does not perfectly favor or
make necessary any particular conclusion. Finally, the
information is provided by sources having any gradation of
credibility and will usually be unreliable to some degree
and for various reasons . Some of these reasons involve
the sources themselves, others involve the manner in which
we subsequently process or interpret what the sources
report to us. You would be hard-pressed to identify a
more difficult intellectual task than that of combining a
mass of incomplete, inconclusive, and unreliable
information in order to arrive at a defensible conclusion.
David A. Schunr
A. INTRODUCTION
Too often people throw around the terms analysis and all-
source fusion as if they are something which can be easily




Service Publishing Company, 1948), 39. Chapter 8 of this book
is entirely about the evaluation of information and provides
an excellent primer on that topic for any military
intelligence analyst
.
26David A. Schum, Evidence And Inference For The
Intelligence Analyst (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of
America, 1987) ,2.
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accomplished or even measured. In reality they are both
complex processes which in and of themselves are part of
larger more complex processes, all of which are part of the
overall intelligence process. Although both can be
accomplished at times with little or no apparent effort,
analysis and all-source fusion reflect complex thinking and
reasoning skills. The most common forms of reasoning used in
inferential intelligence analysis, often accomplished by
analysts without any formal training or conscious awareness
of the forms being used, are deductive, inductive, and
abductive reasoning. 27 As alluded to earlier, our
technologies to collect information have far outstripped our
technologies for the inferential use of information. Hence,
other than some automation to assist in the processing and
recording of information, the actual reasoning skills
necessary to analyze, and all-source fuse, information remains
a human brain function.
It has been said that unless analysts lay out their chain
of reasoning and the nature of evidence supporting their
conclusions, policymakers have little reason to prefer
intelligence assessments to reliable newspaper reports, cables
27For a detailed discussion of these three forms of
reasoning, see Schum, Chapter 2 "Ingredients and Reasoning
Patterns of Inferential Intelligence Analysis."
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from overseas representatives, or their own hunches.-"
Military commanders have every reason to expect their
intelligence analysts to lay out chains of reasoning, yet the
skills to do so are not easily learned. Some say that you can
either think and reason this way naturally, or you cannot.
Too often, due to any number of factors, analysts become much
more involved in processing information, rather than analyzing
and fusing information. To fully appreciate the nature of the
challenge for intelligence analysts, this chapter provides a
review of the intelligence analysis process and all-source
fusion, as well as some definitions of terms for a common
frame of reference throughout the rest of this thesis.
B. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Intelligence analysis is the process by which acquired
data is converted into intelligence. Data itself is
information, experience, knowledge, news, intelligence,
descriptions, and statements. Data may be abstract or
tangible, qualitative or quantitative, historical or
contemporary. It may range from small bits of observable
facts all the way up the ladder of complexity and abstraction
to inclusive, unifying generalizations and hypotheses. It may
be oral, written, symbolic, pictographic, or behavioral. The
:8Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989),
76.
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product resulting from the collection, processing,
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all
available data at any given time is intelligence. This
process of intelligence is often depicted as occurring within
what is called the intelligence cycle.
The intelligence cycle consists of five steps: Direction,
Collection, Processing, Production, and Dissemination.
Through the use of these five steps, information is collected
and processed into intelligence, and then disseminated. While
the intelligence cycle is a continuous process, and all phases
take place concurrently, the steps within which analysis
technically occurs are the Processing and Production Steps.
It is important to understand the functions accomplished in
these steps to fully appreciate the complexity and demands on
the personnel
.
At every level, during a crisis, intelligence personnel,
most often designated by billet or function as analyses,
perform all of the following functions in one manner or
another to varying degrees of success. With few exceptions,
during routine garrison operations, these same functions are
not accomplished on a regular basis either in the course of
regular duties nor in training. If the following functional
skills and processes are not taught, trained, nor developed in
peacetime garrison environments, there can be no reasonable
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expectation that they will be accomplished effectively during
a crisis or actual combat situation.
1. Processing of Informat ion/Data - "
In the processing step, information is systematically
recorded for ease of handling, study and comparison. When
necessary, raw information is converted into usable forms,
formats, symbols, representations, or incidents in preparation
for conversion to intelligence. Collation takes place of like
or related bits of information in preparation for production
of intelligence.
Recording is the systematic arrangement of all items
of information so that they can be observed as an integrated
picture and studied in relation to each other. Recording
media generally consist of enemy situation maps at various
-'Although a purist might seek to differentiate
technically between the terms "data" and "information," for
the purposes of discussion in this paper, data and information
refer to the same thing. The discussion on Processing and
Production is a synthesis drawn from four primary sources
unless otherwise footnoted: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-20: Commander's Guide to
Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, 1991), 4-1 through 4-5; Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-21: MAGTF Intelligence
Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, 1991), 15-1 through 15-9; Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 3-28: Tri-MEF
Standing Operating Procedures for Field Intelligence
Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, 1992), 6-2 through 6-9; and Headquarters, Department of
the Army, Field Manual 34-3: Intelligence Analysis
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army,
1990) , 2-3 through 2-18.
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scales, an intelligence journal, a journal file, and
intelligence workbooks. The journal and journal file may be
automated or manually generated paper documents.
Additionally, geographic coordinate registers may be kept as
a cross reference to record activity over time at certain
locations, and various order of battle files are often
maintained to record and document enemy order of battle
information
.
Typical order of battle information records and files
include order of battle situation map overlays, order of
battle cards by enemy echelon/unit, personality files,
military installation files, enemy organizational charts, and
strength and combat effectiveness worksheets (necessary when
figuring battle damage assessment figures on enemy units)
.
Although varying in degree and emphasis from one type conflict
to another, this type information must be initially acquired
and constantly maintained and updated.
Recording and processing are time consuming and
manpower intensive. Tables of organization do not
specifically identify personnel by billet to accomplish these
functions, yet in many cases, particularly at higher levels,
these become full time functions/duties which must be
accomplished by personnel designated as "analysts." (This
topic is discussed in more length in Chapters III and IV.)
The more time spent accomplishing the mechanical processes of
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recording and collating information, the less time is
available for actual analysis. Automation accomplishes some
of these tasks at certain levels in the Marine Corps, but a
number of factors currently mitigate against fully optimizing
this capability. These factors are covered in later chapters.
2. Production
Production is the conversion of information into
intelligence through the evaluation, integration, analysis,
and interpretation of all-source data and the preparation of
intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user
requirements. Like the steps in the overall intelligence
cycle, these four steps in the production phase of
intelligence are done continually and concurrently.
As information is acquired, it must always be
evaluated to determine its pertinence, reliability, and
credibility
.
30 This evaluation phase actually takes place
twice. It initially occurs as the information first becomes
available to the intelligence section when a rapid
determination must be made, particularly in combat situations,
on whether to disseminate the "raw" information before it has
been fully processed, integrated, evaluated, analyzed, and
30For an excellent historical perspective on evaluation
at the tactical level (little has changed since WW I ) see
Walter C. Sweeney, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Military
Intelligence—A New Weapon In War , Chapter 8, "Evaluation of
Information," (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1924),
162-187.
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interpreted. This is done almost instinctively, and is
technically unevaluated data called combat information, it is
gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander
which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criti-Cality
of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical
intelligence in time to satisfy the user's tactical
intelligence requirements. 31 A second, more systematic
evaluation of the same information continues within the
intelligence section by the analysts after the information has
been initially routed as combat information, and follow-up
amplification or clarification of the same information is
provided as applicable.
Evaluation of information at lower echelons is a
simple step compared to the procedures employed at higher
echelons. Any number of factors influence this from the
narrower geographical focus to the more focused mission of the
unit. At a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) level, there
is a complete spectrum of intelligence functions which must be
performed encompassing support to a ground combat element, an
air combat element and a combat service support element . The
higher the echelon, the more complex becomes the entire task.
nJoint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02, Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Office of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), 74.
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Pertinence is the examination of information to
determine whether or not the information is pertinent with
regard to the enemy or to the battlefield area. Information
is also examined to determine who may also need the
information and how quickly. This is part of the initial and
second evaluation phases mentioned above.
The information is also evaluated in terms of
reliability. This is done in relation to both the source of
the information and the agency by which it was collected or
obtained. The principal basis for judging the reliability of
a source or agency, is previous experience with the source.
Criteria for evaluating tactical unit reporting include
knowledge of their training, experience, and past performance.
The headquarters closest to the source or agency is ordinarily
the best judge of its reliability. For any echelon to be even
reasonably expected to be able to make source reliability
judgments in a crisis or combat situation, that echelon must
be familiar with the type and format of reporting, as well as
the general strengths and weaknesses of a particular reporting
agency or source in general, prior to actual commitment to a
crisis. Thus, an intelligence unit has to have worked with
the data prior to the crisis: it cannot be "turned on" at the
last minute.
Together with reliability, a final consideration in
the evaluation of information is credibility. Credibility
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(sometimes referred to as accuracy) , means the probable truth
of the information based purely on logic. Its credibility is
evaluated based on the consistency of the information within
itself and other information, particularly information known
to be true; and whether the information is confirmed or
corroborated by reports from other sources and agencies. The
most reliable method of judging credibility is comparison with
other information. Where possible, access to multiple sources
of information either through direct collection efforts or
simply being allowed access to information that is available
at other echelons is often the key to success in determining
source credibility. The access to other information is
another important factor and is often one of the most
difficult challenges for intelligence analysts.
Marked differences in the evaluation of the accuracy
of information may occur between higher and lower echelons.
The reason for this difference is because higher echelons,
which usually have more sources of information and
intelligence than lower echelons, have a greater opportunity
to confirm, corroborate, or refute the accuracy of incoming
data. Regardless of the source, the accuracy of incoming
information should be evaluated at each echelon according to
other information and intelligence available at that echelon.
The evaluation process at lowest tactical levels may often be
simpler, because of the lack of competing and contradictory
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sources. Higher echelons can access more sources which often
complicates rather than facilitates the resolution of issues.
The processing and production of information continues
with analysis. It is during this phase of the intelligence
cycle that information becomes intelligence. Analysis is the
sifting and sorting of evaluated information to isolate
significant elements with respect to the mission and
operations of the unit. Analysis requires judgment and a
thorough knowledge of the principles of military operations,
the characteristics of the area of operations, and the enemy
situation, to include enemy doctrine and past practices.
Analysis often involves detailed research with greater
difficulty caused by the increased volume of information.
Individuals who analyze information must relate their efforts
to the unit's mission to avoid needless expenditure of time
and effort
.
Integration is the combination of the elements
isolated in analysis with other known information to form a
logical picture; an hypothesis of enemy activities. In the
process, more than one hypothesis may be formulated based upon
existing intelligence.
In formulating hypotheses, the intelligence analyst
avoids preconceived opinions and hypotheses based solely on
personal experience or preference. The analyst attempts to
adopt the role of the enemy commander in the development of
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these hypotheses. After they are formulated, all hypotheses
are analyzed and tested. Analysis of an hypothesis includes
determining the indications that should exist if the
hypothesis is a valid one. Testing includes verifying the
existence or nonexistence of these indications within the
limitation of available time and means. Integration may be a
mental process completed in a few moments or it may be a
lengthy process involving the collection and evaluation of a
large volume of additional information.
The last step in the processing and production of
information is interpretation. Meaning is deduced from the
hypotheses developed; these are tested and considered valid as
a result of integration. Interpretation is designed to answer
the question: "What does this information mean in relation to
the area of operations, the enemy situation, and the friendly
commander's intent?" The answer provides a conclusion which
can serve as a basis for determining future enemy courses of
action and for keeping the intelligence estimate current.'"
Finally, although this discussion of the processing
and production steps of the intelligence cycle have referred
primarily to the terms information versus intelligence,
32Several outstanding historical examples of evaluation
and interpretation from U.S. Army forces fighting in North
Africa in WWII are provided in Chapter 7 of Lieutenant Colonel
Stedman Chandler and Colonel Robert W. Robb's Front-Line
Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press,
1946) , 93-103 .
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another common reference is often made to "raw intelligence"
versus "finished intelligence." According to Joint Chiefs of
Staff Publication 2-0, raw intelligence is information that
has been collected but not further developed through analysis,
interpretation, or correlation with other intelligence.
Finished intelligence is information that has been analyzed,
integrated, interpreted, and evaluated.'' In this thesis,
the terms information versus intelligence will be used rather
than raw intelligence versus finished intelligence.
3. Types Of Intelligence and Analysis
Within the intelligence community there are three
general types of analysis: descriptive, explanatory, and
predictive or estimative. Descriptive analysis comprises the
great bulk of all military intelligence. Descriptive analysis
provides the basis for explanatory and predictive analysis.
Descriptive analysis attempts to manipulate data by
accumulating, sorting, organizing, classifying, coding, etc.
It answers the question of who, where, how much, how big, how
organized, etc. Historical and current observations are
examined and utilized to describe the characteristics of
things, events, and statements. Accuracy of descriptive
analysis depends primarily upon the accuracy and completeness
"Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2-0, Joint Doctrine
For Intelligence Support To Operations (Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Proposed
Final Draft, undated), II-4.
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of the data. Therefore, the primary requirement of the
analyst is to ensure that the information derived is an
accurate portrayal of the available data. Moreover,
descriptive analysis can be described as data driven analysis.
The results of this type of analysis leads to the production
of intelligence products such as intelligence surveys,
handbooks, maps, order-of -battle studies, annotated charts and
photographs, etc.' 4 This category also includes answers to
all manners of Requests for Information (RFI's), which are
generated in great volume when a crisis erupts. Much of this
information resides in various databases at different levels
of classification at various echelons within the U.S.
intelligence community or from unclassified open sources.
Explanatory intelligence seeks to explain why an event
happened by relating it to causal factors, putting it into
wider context of time and place, and explaining why the event
is important.'' Explanatory analysis attempts to make data
understandable, and therefore, useable. It is based more on
analytical judgments about the data rather than just
describing it. The primary task of the analyst conducting
34James D. Hammond, "So You Want To Be An Intelligence
Analyst!" (Masters Research Paper, Defense Intelligence
College, 1983), 8.
3SRonald D. Garst, ed., A Handbook of Intelligence
Analysis , second edition, (Washington, D.C.: School of
Professional Studies, Defense Intelligence College, 1989), 96.
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explanatory analysis is to seek a plausible explanation that
is satisfactory in regard to the available evidence.'
Products resulting from explanatory analysis include
assessmencs , analytic comparisons, special studies, etc. This
type of analysis is much more difficult than descriptive
analysis and requires higher and more complex thinking and
reasoning skills.
Predictive analysis is based upon both descriptive and
explanatory analysis. Predictive analysis attempts to answer
the question: "What is most likely to happen and why?"
Logically, predictive analysis results in a prediction or
forecast. Predictive analysis is by far, the most difficult
type of analysis, yet the type often expected of even the most
inexperienced intelligence analyst. In tactical analysis at
the lowest echelons, this can be accomplished somewhat more
easily based upon a simple analysis of the terrain, weather,
and relative enemy strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, and
limitations relative to friendly forces. This problem and
challenge expands exponentially at the operational and
strategic levels of analysis. 37 The ultimate challenge to
36Hammond, 9.
37Although geared toward strategic intelligence analysis,
detailed explanations, examples, and suggested methods for
accomplishing all three types of analysis are found in Stephen
J. Andriole, Methods for Intelligence Analysis, Production,
and Presentation (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence
College Handbook), Chapters 9-11. Sherman Kent's Strategic
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the intelligence analyst is to be able to make that leap from
descriptive and explanatory analysis to sound predictive
analysis and to avoid Townsend's characterization:
Any G-2's chances of telling what the enemy is going to do
are actually no better than anyone else's--the man in the
street, some student, or a hermit.'
4. Levels of Intelligence and Analysis
For purposes of this thesis, three levels of
intelligence and analysis will be considered: strategic
intelligence, operational intelligence, and tactical
intelligence. Joint Publication 2-0 provides the following
definitions of these three levels. Strategic intelligence is
that required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and
military plans and operations at national and theater levels.
Operational intelligence is that required for planning Service
and joint operations. Tactical intelligence is that required
for planning and conducting tactical operations.'
Intelligence For American World Policy (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1949) also provides a classic
explanation in a chapter each of these three basic types of
analysis. Again, although discussed in a strategic
intelligence analysis context, the explanations provide one of
the very best descriptions of these three types of analysis.
The principles apply to all levels of intelligence analysis.
38Elias Carter Townsend, Colonel, Infantry, U.S. Army,
Risks: The Key to Combat Intelligence (Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company, 1955), 4.
39Joint Pub 2-0 (Draft), GL-20, GL-23.
34
In the Marine Corps, tactical intelligence relates
primarily to those units at Division, Wing, and Force Service
Support Group and below. Tactical intelligence often focuses
on fleeting opportunities and, thus, depends on" rapid
reporting, sometimes without the luxury of multiple sources.
Operational intelligence is primarily the concern of Marine
Expeditionary Force level units acting either as a Marine
Component or as a joint task force, although both tactical and
strategic levels of intelligence are to varying degrees
(situation dependent) also of concern. Intelligence at this
level demands more careful scrutiny of information. Strategic
intelligence is primarily within the purview of the Marine
Corps' service level intelligence organizations both at
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and at the Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity. Delineation of these levels of concern
and various fusion organizations are found in Chapter III.
C. ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE, FUSION, AND TAILORED INTELLIGENCE
All-source intelligence, all-source fusion, and tailored,
all-source fusion are terms which are used with increasing
familiarity although they actually mean many things to many
people. This is the case for both intelligence and
nonintelligence personnel both inside and outside the
military intelligence community. A look at all three concepts
provides a necessary framework for the rest of this thesis.
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1. All-Source Intelligence
All-source intelligence is defined in Joint Pub 2-0:
intelligence products and/or organizations and activities
that incorporate all sources of information, including,
most frequently, HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, SIGINT and open
source, in the production of finished intelligence. 40
This definition serves as a useful departure for an
examination of this term which is actually a concept. The
concept actually should more appropriately be called multiple
source intelligence since it is a misnomer to ever believe
that all sources of information will be available to answer
the intelligence question at hand. What it does imply is that
all available sources of information obtainable at that
echelon have been incorporated into the finished intelligence
assessment at any given time.
The ints listed in the definition are those most often
readily accessible to intelligence personnel at a joint level
(national or theater) . The following list of ints provides
a more inclusive look at the various sources of information
and intelligence which should be incorporated into all-source
analysis whenever available and pertinent: 41
40 Joint Pub 2-01, GL-5.
41Armed Forces Staff College Publication 2, Service
Warfiqhting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces
(Norfolk, Virginia: National Defense University, 1992), II-5-
B-7 . For a full definition of each of these ints, see Joint
Pub 1-02 .
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* IMINT -Imagery derived intelligence
* PHOTINT -Photographic intelligence
* SIGINT -Signals intelligence
* COMINT -Communi cat ions intelligence
* ELINT -Electronic intelligence
* FISINT -Foreign instrumentation SIGINT
* HUMINT -Human resources intelligence
* MASINT -Measurement and signature intelligence
* ACINT -Acoustical intelligence
* OPINT -Optical intelligence
* IRINT -Infrared intelligence
* NUCINT -Nuclear intelligence
* RINT -Unintentional radiation intelligence
* RADINT -Radar intelligence
Although this contemporary list of ints could lead one to
believe that all-source fusion is a relatively new concept,
both Clausewitz and Jomini accepted that not all reports are
reliable and that multiple sources of information were
desirable. Jomini stressed the need to use multidimensional
information systems, in a sense making him the progenitor of
modern all-source intelligence:
A general should neglect no means of gaining information
of the enemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should
make use of reconnaissances, spies, bodies of light troops
commanded by capable officers, signals, and questioning
deserters and prisoners.... Perfect reliance should be
placed on none of these means. 42
Both in Napoleon's time and today, a multitude of sources are
of little use unless they have been fused.
"Henri Jomini, The Art of War , trans. G. H. Mendell and
W. P. Craighill (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1977), 274 quoted in Victor M. Rosello, "Clausewitz ' s Contempt
for Intelligence," Parameters XXI (Spring 1991): 109.
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2. Fusion
Fusion is defined in Joint Pub 2-0 as: "...the
process of examining all sources of intelligence information
to derive complete assessment of activity." 43 This is a
somewhat restrictive definition in that it limits the concept
to examining all sources as they relate to assessment of
activity . A more useful, inclusive definition is: "The
blending of intelligence information from multiple sources to
produce a single intelligence product." 44 Fusion is
essentially another word to encompass the entire concept of
what occurs during the Production step of the intelligence
cycle. It is this definition and understanding which is used
in the rest of this thesis.
3. Tailored Intelligence
While many references are made to tailored
intelligence, there appears to be no formal definition of the
term in military intelligence related publications and
references. According to the American Heritage Dictionary,
tailored in this context is defined, "to make, alter or adapt
for a particular end or purpose." Tailored intelligence is
simply intelligence made or adapted specifically for a
particular consumer with particular intelligence requirements.
4jJoint Pub 2-0 (Draft), GL-12.
44MAGTF Intelligence Operations , WW-9
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This concept is particularly important to an understanding and
appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of various
intelligence agencies' reporting/ focus throughout the
intelligence community at both national and theater levels.
It is also important in understanding why the Marine Corps has
been striving to expand their organic capabilities to produce
all-source, fused, tailored intelligence.
D. SUMMARY
All-source fusion and tailoring of intelligence is a much
more complex concept and process than most who have not had to
do it understand. The efficient and accurate processing of
information is a challenge in and of itself, let alone
performing the complex reasoning skills necessary to convert
a mass of often conflicting, incomplete, and questionable
information into pertinent, timely, usable, fused and tailored
intelligence. In the military, it should never be forgotten
that information is not processed and intelligence is not
produced for any other reason than to support commanders in
their decision making process. While the requirements may
vary widely from echelon to echelon, the goal of Marine Corps
intelligence is to provide to commanders and other consumers
the very best possible all-source, fused, tailored
intelligence from all the information accessible at each
echelon. Today, any number of factors are seriously impeding
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our ability to do this. The responses from the first question
in this author's questionnaire survey bear this out. When
asked, "Overall, how adequately do you feel we accomplish all-
source fused intelligence in the Marine Corps?," 27 percent
of the 147 respondents replied not very adequately; 40 percent
responded somewhat adequately; 2 5 percent responded
adequately; only 3 percent responded very adequately; and none
responded extremely adequately. (Five percent chose not to
respond at all.) The remaining chapters seek to explain the
major reasons why.
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III. STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, AND MANNING
Planning analysis is largely a matter of planning people,
and planning people for intelligence analysis can be as
difficult as planning machines and organizations.
Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman^
A. INTRODUCTION/FACTORS
No other factors are more important in the effort to
develop an all-source intelligence analysis capability than
organizational structure and manning of those organizations.
Without sufficient organizational structure and adequate
manning of that structure, no amount of data or connectivity
to all-source information will accomplish the goal of
providing all-source fused, tailored intelligence to Marines.
In fact, ongoing efforts to increase the connectivity pipeline
with the corresponding potential to access large volumes of
data only exacerbates the problem if the organization is not
in place to take advantage of the increased access . What then
is the "right" organization of limited resources to accomplish
the goal of all-source fused intelligence support? What
should be the manning priority? What should be the mix
between intelligence billets within the Marine Corps and
external to the Marine Corps such as in national and theater
45Berkowitz and Goodman, 22
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level organizations? What effects are ongoing Department of
Defense intelligence reorganization initiatives having on all-
source fused intelligence support to Marines? These questions
are examined in this chapter.
B . BACKGROUND
As outlined in Chapter I, in 1988 the Marine Corps decided
to focus its effort to enhance all-source fusion capability
structurally and functionally at the Service level with the
creation of the Marine Corps Intelligence Center, and at the
operational level with the creation of MAGTF All-Source Fusion
Centers. A slightly more detailed look at both these
organizations and the framework within which they have had to
operate provides necessary perspective for further discussion
of how structure, organization, and manning of Marine Corps
intelligence affects all-source fusion analysis capabilities.
1. Marine Corps Intelligence Center
When the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC) was
created, the Marine Corps was the only U.S. military service
that did not have its own intelligence center capable of
analyzing, tailoring, fusing, and producing all-source
intelligence. The original goal was to have a dedicated,
service level all-source intelligence center focused on
expeditionary and amphibious intelligence support to Fleet
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Marine Forces. 4 ' The MCIC's eventual official mission
statement published on 29 June 1991 in the Table of
Organization promulgation, expanded that mission to include:
...will provide tailored intelligence and services which:
support the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and his
staff in his role as the Marine Corps member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; support the development of service-unique
doctrine, force structure, training and education, and
acquisition policy and programming; and support Fleet
Marine Force contingency planning and other requirements
for intelligence products which are not satisfied by
either theater, other service, or national research and
analysis capabilities (author's emphasis) . Ensure all
supported elements of the Service receive timely and
concise intelligence which emphasizes the threat, terrain,
and other considerations specifically pertinent to the
mission of the Marine Corps and which are applicable to
the areas of the world in which the Marine Corps can
expect to conduct expeditionary operations. 47
Together with the generalized mission statement was a listing
of nineteen separate tasks. Eighteen of those tasks were
related to supporting service level intelligence decision-
making and functioning within the Washington, D.C. national
arena and supporting tenant commands and activities at the
Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Quantico, Virginia.
46Beans, "Marine Corps Intelligence in Low Intensity
Conflicts, " 28.
47Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "USMC Intelligence
Center Table of Organization 7451," (Washington, D.C:
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 29 June 1991), 1.
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The single task related to supporting Marine operating forces
stated:
Provide research, analysis, and tailored intelligence
products for Fleet Marine Force contingency planning,
training, and ad hoc requirements which are not satisfied
by theater, national-level , or other-service intelligence
capabilities (author's emphasis). 48
The caveat "which are not satisfied by theater,
was added to avoid duplication of effort within the
intelligence community, since funding was sought from national
intelligence community budgets for civilian analysis billets
at the MCIC.
When created, the Marine Corps Intelligence Center
used the Marine Corps officer and enlisted billets from
organizations and billets which already existed at Quantico.
In addition, nearly two thirds of the billets created were
earmarked as • civilian positions, funded both by the Marine
Corps and by the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP)
.
This is in marked contrast to the steps taken to man the MAGTF
All-Source Fusion Centers (MAFCs).
Since its inception, the MCIC has accomplished all-
source analysis in support of the aforementioned mission and
the nineteen tasks. The majority of effort at the MCIC has
been related to strategic level intelligence support,
encompassing broad picture predictive estimates relative to
48 Ibid., 2.
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the general nature of the threat as it applies to Marine Corps
operating forces, and day-to-day general intelligence support
to Washington and Quantico area Marine Corps consumers. 4 '
Specific support to Fleet Marine Force elements has included
production of unclassified Mobile Training Team country
handbooks for various countries of interest, predeployment
(author's emphasis) threat analysis briefings for Marine
Expeditionary Unit staffs, as well as a number of contingency
support products for Marines deployed to several recent hot
spots including Somalia. 50
On 1 January 1993, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
redesignated the Marine Corps Intelligence Center as the
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) , National Maritime
Intelligence Center (NMIC) , Suitland, Maryland. The MCIA has
absorbed the Marines at the various Navy intelligence
activities at Suitland and reformed them into an Expeditionary
4aSee Alfred M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps White
Letter 2-91 dated 27 Jun 91 for General Gray's description of
the Marine Corps Intelligence Center and his vision for it
four years after he had directed its establishment . This was
one of General Gray's last official pronouncements before
retiring as Commandant.
50Once any Marine unit deploys from garrison as part of
a Navy or Joint Task Force, it falls under operational control
of that unit and all intelligence support is to be provided
through that new operational chain of command, back up through
the CINC level JIC and then to the National level if
necessary. Technically, if that chain of command cannot
satisfy a particular intelligence requirement, only then can




Warfare Support Division. The Marine Corps Intelligence
Activity has also been tasked with delegated production
responsibility for Appendix E (Antilanding Plan) of various
Defense Intelligence Military Capabilities Studies scheduled
for production each year. As per their charter and mission,
the MCIA continues to remain focused primarily on all-source
fused intelligence support at the national service level, with
ad hoc contingency support to Marine operating forces allowed
technically only when not satisfied by theater, other service
or national research and analysis capabilities.
2. MAGTF All -Source Fusion Centers
Operational and tactical level all-source fused
intelligence support to Marine operating forces in the Fleet
Marine Force became the purview of the Surveillance,
Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group in each of the three
Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) --specif ically, in a brand
new organization called the MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center
(hereafter referred to as MAFC) . The mission of a MAFC was:
...to provide fused, all-source intelligence to MAGTF
commanders, and other commanders as directed. The MAFC,
as a consolidated, closely knit group of intelligence
officers and specialists will provide the intelligence
necessary to support contingency planning and current
intelligence/threat requirements of the MEF (Marine
Expeditionary Force), its subordinate MAGTFs, and other
commanders as directed. During operations and exercises,
the MAFC will provide the intelligence necessary to
support future operations and plans, deliberate targeting,
and development of enemy situation and capabilities. It
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will process information from both organic collection and
reporting, and from external agencies. 5i
This mission statement reflected the operational and tactical
level emphasis of these organizations.
Although the line numbers for each of the 50 billets
in each of the MAFCs was acquired somewhat differently, all
150 billets total were structured with compensatory reductions
from other Fleet Marine Force units. The billets came from
various existing force structure billets in the then six
existing Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) and from each of
the three MEF Command Elements, three Marine Divisions, three
Marine Aircraft Wings, and three Force Service Support Groups
(FSSGs). The centralization of the all-source fusion effort
in a MAFC supporting each MEF reflected a Marine Corps
decision that such a move was a worthwhile investment in terms
of both structure and manning to increase overall all-source
fusion analysis capability, albeit at the expense of structure
and manning in other units.
slHeadquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force
Manual 3-2 6 (Coordinating Draft) : The MAGTF All-Source Fusion
Center (MAFC) and All-Source Fusion of Intelligence (Quantico,
Virginia: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1992), 1-
5. This draft publication has not been approved for
publication as of this writing and is currently on hold while
Marine Corps intelligence structure is being reviewed for
possible reorganization.
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The three MAFCs were identical in structure with a Table
of Organization of 12 officers and 38 enlisted.- 1 MAFC billet
composition reflected the mission of the organization and was
heavily weighted with unrestricted intelligence officers and
enlisted intelligence analysts. In addition, there were
billets for an officer and enlisted signal intelligence
specialists, an officer and enlisted counterintelligence
specialists, and enlisted imagery interpreters. The total of
50 also included six enlisted billets to operate and maintain
the Intelligence Analysis Center (IAC). 53
Around the activation dates of each of the three
MAFCs, personnel from each of the aforementioned units in the
Marine Corps were transferred to the respective MAFC with the
official shift in billet structure following a year or so
later when the final Table of Organization was approved at
Headquarters Marine Corps. The Marine Corps believed that by
pooling the analytical effort in a MAFC, all-source fused
intelligence would be produced and disseminated back to all of
these units which had given up both billets and manning to
"Although there were several iterations of the T/O, the
last one promulgated was T/O 4707 dated 23 May 1991.
53The IAC was a Vietnam era developed computer system of
several separate large shelters (vans) designed to provide
automated intelligence support. These systems never reached
their potential and have been totally phased out of the Marine
Corps. The follow-on system is the Intelligence Analysis




serve this goal. All-source fusion analysis and production is
manpower intensive at the MEF level. A MEF must focus on both
operational and tactical level intelligence in support of
ground, air, and combat service support units through the
entire depth of an assigned area of responsibility. This
breadth of responsibility coupled with access to not only all
Marine organic collection asset reporting but to theater and
national asset reporting as well, constitutes the most
complicated all-source fusion analysis challenge for
intelligence analysts at any level in the Marine Corps. i4
During its evolution as a completely new organization,
the proposed concept was for the MAFC to serve primarily as an
all-source fusion analytical center in garrison which during
crises would then provide personnel to augment existing MAGTF
intelligence staff sections at both the MEF and MEB levels.*"
This was to provide primarily an added all-source fusion
- 4 In actual crisis situations, a tremendous amount of time
is spent deconf licting contradictory reporting from the
numerous "assessments" being arrived at by other services and
agencies. This is a necessary part of the business of
intelligence work but is a hidden drain on limited manpower
assets
.
"Augmentation to one or two MEBs was under the old MEF
deployment scheme of deploying as MEBs into an AOR with one of
the MEBs serving as the MEF Forward until the main MEF
Headquarters could deploy into the region. The MAFC would
split out detachments to one or two MEB Command Elements for
initial deployment but reconstitute as an entire MAFC in
support of the MEF after the MEB Command Elements combined
with the MEF Command Element.
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analytical capability to the supported MAGTF G-2 section. In
practice, both before and during Desert Shield/Storm,
personnel who deployed as part of a supporting MAFC detachment
were needed by the supported units to fill empty billets
throughout the G-2 sections, not just analytical billets.
This reflected the lingering impact of having pulled bodies
from these MAGTF units to originally form the respective
MAFCs . Furthermore, the concept did not include providing
analysts back to the divisions, wings, or force service
support groups who had given up analyst billets and bodies to
form the MAFCs in the first place. 5b However, the larger
contributing problem was the overall low peacetime manning
levels of the units in the first place, a particular problem
for the intelligence MOS in the Marine Corps.
3. Manning Policy^ 7
Despite the objective of the Marine Corps manpower
process to provide the appropriate number of adequately
5bThe 2d MAFC did provide one officer and four enlisted
analysts to the 2d Marine Division for Desert Storm. This was
under the caveat in the MAFC mission which stated, "and
support to other commanders as directed."
57The author hesitates to address an extremely complex
process in such an extremely abbreviated fashion. However,
the generalizations made herein are the author's based on 23
March and 25 May 93 interviews with Major Bill Philbin,
Headquarters Marine Corps, C4I Branch, Intelligence MOS
Specialist, and a 25 May interview with Major Angie Salinas,
Headquarters Marine Corps Manpower Branch (MMOA-1) Ground
Assignments Monitor.
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trained, sufficiently experienced, usable Marines to the
commander to perform his mission, undermanning was identified
by survey respondents as the single most contributing factor
inhibiting the ability to accomplish all-source fused
intelligence analysis. 58 Although manning challenges are
extremely complex in general, manning the intelligence field
is particularly challenging due to the proportionally high
number of external billets compared to Fleet Marine Force
(FMF) billets.
Roughly one fourth of Marine intelligence officer
billets are external to the Marine Corps, i.e., in joint,
naval, or other agency billets. These billets are called
"excepted" and are manned at 100 percent and are filled with
the best possible fit by rank and experience. Defense
Intelligence Agency analyst billets and all Unified Command J-
2 billets are examples in this category. The next category
for manning is called "priority" and reflects those billets in
the Marine Corps which are manned at 100 percent, although not
necessarily at the exact rank structure designated. The
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity falls into this category,
as do all seven Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) . Finally,
the rest of the FMF falls under what is called "proportionate
E,8Manpower process objective taken from the first slide
of a Headquarters Marine Corps instructional briefing
entitled, "The United States Marine Corps Manpower Process or,
Manpower 101.
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share commands." After all excepted and priority command
billets are filled, whatever is left in the manpower pool is
then directed to fill the proportionate share commands in the
FMF . The result of these manning priorities and a continuing
overall shortage of intelligence personnel results in serious
manning deficiencies for MEF, Division, Wing, FSSG, and SRI
Group units. These units are generally manned at around 50
percent with efforts to "flush out" the intelligence sections
with reserve or regular augmentation during exercises and
crises. This serious undermanning problem directly or
indirectly affects training, assignments, focus of effort, and
the ability to automate the intelligence effort. The effects
of this manning policy, and overall short manning situation in
the FMF, on all-source fusion analytical capability became
only too apparent during operation Desert Shield/Storm.
4. Operation Desert Shield/ Storm59
Other than a number of MEB and MEF level exercises,
the MAFC concept of all-source fused intelligence support was
not fully tested until Operation Desert Storm at which time a
lesson was relearned from World War II: "the compilers of the
"Hereaf ter throughout this thesis, reference to "Desert
Storm" will mean the period covered by both Desert Shield and
Desert Storm.
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tables of organization have not favored the 2 (intelligence),
and in battle personnel becomes a major problem. " DU
Because of the way by which the MAFC billets were
manned prior to Operation Desert Storm, major subordinate
commands (the Marine ground divisions, aircraft wings, and
FSSGs) as well as the MEB and MEF Command elements which
deployed were short of personnel. Although the 2d MAFC was
"fat" with all 50 T/O billets manned at the outbreak of the
conflict, the unit was fragmented to provide support to other
deploying units. 51 Three officers and 10 enlisted were
deployed in August 1990 as augmenters to the 4th MEB for
immediate deployment to the Persian Gulf. An additional one
officer and four enlisted were provided to 2d Marine Division
to shore up their personnel situation. Since the II MEF
Command Element did not deploy to Southwest Asia, the majority
of the remainder of the 2d MAFC, deployed in January as
augmenters for the I MEF G-2 section.
'°'JStedman Chandler and Robert W. Robb, Lieutenant
Colonels, U.S. Army Military Intelligence Reserves , Front-Line
Intelligence
,
(Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press,
1946), 87.
blThe term "fat" is used because of the unusual
circumstance of having all 50 billets filled in peacetime for
a wartime Table of Organization. However, at the outbreak of
Desert Shield, all-source fusion analytical capability was
limited for any number of other reasons elaborated on in the
remainder of this paper.
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The 1st MAFC had deployed to Southwest Asia in August
in direct support of the I MEF G-2, and initially provided all
of I MEF G-2's analysts and most of its targeting and
collections personnel despite being manned at only 50
percent. 02 Like all MEF Command Element G-2 Sections (and
other G-staff sections), I MEF had to count on significant
augmentation to flush out its wartime billet structure.
Unfortunately, even when composited (staffs combined) with the
7th MEB G-2 section, the I MEF G-2 was critically short of
personnel." Additional augmenters were provided from 1st
MEB in Hawaii and eventually in January 1991 from the 2d MAFC
along with reservists called to active duty. It was not until
16 January that the Analysis and Production section was
staffed with its final number of 23 personnel out of the 33
people it rated by T/O. 64
62Michael H. Decker, "Assessing the Intelligence Effort,"
Marine Corps Gazette , 75 (September 1991): 23.
b
'In the early 1980s the Marine Corps had developed an
operational doctrine which in general terms counted on the
compositing or combining of two deployed MEB staffs with the
nucleus staff of a follow-on MEF Command Element to form a
composite full MEF staff over a Division, Wing, and FSSG. The
concept was to deploy in increments as MEUs and MEBs and
employ as a MEF level MAGTF . During Desert Storm, the
amphibious 4th MEB remained embarked at sea as a USCENTCOM
reserve while only the 7th MPF (maritime preposit loned force)
MEB was available initially for compositing with the I MEF
nucleus staff.
c,4 Peter Morosoff, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Marine Expeditionary Command and Control in Southwest Asia
(Quantico, Virginia: The Marine Corps Research Center, 1991),
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The effects of this piecemeal augmentation effort on
the G-2 Analysis and Production (A&P) Section were disruptive
to the analytical effort. Personnel showing up at different
times throughout the buildup were placed into the A&P Section
and took over various billets due to rank and were not
necessarily the best qualified to hold those positions. In
many cases, new arrivals did not have the benefit of working
the problem from the beginning and accordingly, lacked proper
perspective. The Marine Corps stresses the value of teamwork
and of "knowing your personnel." Nowhere is this more
important than in coordinating the efforts of personnel
engaged in conducting all-source fusion analysis. The
strengths and weaknesses of each analyst must be known in
depth to ensure the proper assignment and utilization of that
individual in the analytical team effort. Clearly, this
cannot happen effectively when unknown personnel, regardless
of experience or talent, show up in a staggered manner and are
piecemealed into the all-source fusion analytical problem.
However, if the section is undermanned to the point where "any
warm body" is a help if for no other reason than to perform
basic recording and other processing functions, than
augmentation is beneficial. When queried whether "personnel_
24, Research Paper No. 92-0005. The opinions and conclusions
of the report are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the view of the Marine Corps Research Center or any
other governmental agency.
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augmentation (regular or reserves) to fill empty line numbers
(billets) immediately • prior to major exercises or actual
developing crisis situations enhances ability to conduct all-
source fused intelligence analysis," 60 percent of the survey
respondents strongly agreed or agreed while 34 percent
disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 6 percent had no opinion
or failed to respond. Part two of the same question asked how
long in advance augmenters should arrive to be really useful.
Two thirds of the respondents said one or more months. This
is seldom achieved in the Marine Corps today, since developing
crises rarely provide that kind of lead time nor can the
expense of augmenters (time and money) be afforded that far in
advance for exercise augmentation. Respondents ' believed that
augmentation at the last minute before or even during a
crisis, was actually counterproductive. However, many stated
that any help is appreciated due to the very low manning
levels
.
For the I MEF G-2 A&P Section in Southwest Asia, even
when eventually fully augmented, the demands of operating 24
hours a day and just accomplishing the many processing and
dissemination tasks seriously eroded the overall all-source
fusion analytical effort. In an examination of the




Discussions with commanders and intelligence personnel
indicate that the MEF did not provide fused intelligence
adequately tailored to the needs of the tactical
commander. Intelligence products lacked clear analysis of
enemy activity and reporting was primarily focused on the
operational versus tactical level....
...The MEF was burdened with a staggering volume of
information and did not have the personnel, ADP, or
communications assets to adequately process and
disseminate that information (author's emphasis). 65
Challenged to just process and disseminate the vast amounts of
raw information and finished intelligence from other agencies,
the all-source fusion analysts were hard pressed to accomplish
the most vital and difficult component of the entire
intelligence process--all-source fused, tailored
intelligence
.
bt Within all the constraints, the analysts did
a very credible job, particularly at the operational/tactical
level of detail required to support the MEF Commander and his
t?F.D. Houston and P.J. Nagy, Majors, USMC, Intelligence
Operations in Southwest Asia (Quantico, Virginia: The Marine
Corps Research Center, 1991), 10, Research Paper No. 92-0008
(Part No. 1) . The opinions and conclusions of the report are
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the view
of the Marine Corps Research Center or any other governmental
agency. The complaint of operational focus at the expense of
tactical was a common complaint outside the Marine Corps as
well. See U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian
Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Appendices A-S, April
1992, C-13.
DbSee Nagy and Houston, page 3 for a discussion of the
challenges of handling the raw information flowing into I MEF.
They cite an average figure of 1200-1400 general service
(GENSER) messages, plus an additional 1600-1800 special
intelligence (SI) and recorded voice messages per day, leading
up to the ground war. The total daily number increased to
6000 to 8000 daily during the ground war.
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staff. When asked about tactical intelligence in an interview
for the August 1992 Armed Forces Journal, Lieutenant General
Walter E. Boomer, the I MEF Commander for Desert Storm,
responded
:
First of all, I don't think we had an intelligence
failure. For example, I knew where all of the Iraqi
units, by name, were located, with few exceptions, and
that doesn't happen without good intelligence." 7
Finally, during Desert Storm, other theater components
could rely on their respective service level intelligence
centers for dedicated tailored intelligence support.
MARCENT/I MEF did not have a dedicated fusion center at the
service level, since the Marine Corps Intelligence Center was
still under its initial development. 68
Despite the organizational upheaval caused by the
formation of the MAFCs, the piecemeal deployment and
o7Glenn W. Goodman, Jr. and John G. Roos, "An Exclusive
AFJI Interview with Lt . Gen. Walter E. Boomer, USMC, " Armed
Forces Journal International (August 1992): 38.
"Houston and Nagy, 5. Within existing capabilities at
the time, the Marine Corps Intelligence Center did provide
intelligence support to Marines in Washington, D.C. and
Quantico
. Because of the size and scope of Operation Desert
Storm, and the fact that the U.S. Central Command J-2 was hard
pressed to support the CINC, other service level intelligence
organizations as well as many other DoD intelligence
organizations rushed to provide any type support they were
capable of and for which a perceived or actual need existed.
One of the lessons learned was that these efforts were not
well coordinated and there was both duplication of effort and
gaps in effort. Many of these lessons learned have driven the
new DoD intelligence architecture/reorganization.
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integration of various sections and individuals in the
analytical efforts at various levels, and the tremendous
volume of information which had to be dealt with, all-source
fusion analysis was in fact accomplished, albeit not as
effectively as many desired. Fortunately for the I MEF G-2,
the Iraqis allowed the United States the luxury of time to
piecemeal together a functioning all-source fusion analytical
effort. This will not always be the case in future crises.
C. POST DESERT STORM/CURRENT SITUATION
1. Intelligence Study Group Findings
Between 19 and 30 August 1991, the Marine Corps
reconvened an Intelligence Study Group (ISG) with
representatives from throughout the Marine Corps to continue
an examination of intelligence deficiencies identified before
the Desert Storm experience. The group's first key conclusion
was that the intelligence structure in the Marine Corps was
inadequate. Furthermore, that to provide adequate
intelligence support, all intelligence structure must be
manned. Under the section of their report titled
Organizational Architecture, the group:
validated the SRI Group concept but also indicated a
strong belief that creating the SRI Group's MAGTF All-
Source Fusion Center (MAFC) by stripping the MSC
headquarters of virtually all their intelligence analysts
sorely inhibits flexible and timely analytic response to
changing key intelligence requirements at the MSC
level ....
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. . .At each of the tactical level commands there is a need
for intelligence analysts. In addition to supporting
their own level these analysts can assist subordinate
levels through the provision of tailored intelligence
product. The personnel required to handle the volume of
data available from an analytic standpoint must be further
augmented at higher levels in order to have the capacity
to also provide tailored support downwards. 69
The study group also recommended that the MAFC must be opcon
to the MEF G-2, a situation which would give the MEF G-2
direct tasking authority and control.
The report continued:
The immediate conclusion of the group was that
intelligence manning in the Marine Corps is totally
inadequate. In order to achieve adequate intelligence
support, there is a personnel cost which simply must be
paid. Without a significant increase in the number of
personnel throughout the Marine Corps, there is no hope
for any major improvement in the quantity or quality of
support provided. 7(
The structure and manning deficiencies cited in their report
left little doubt as to why all-source fused, tailored
intelligence analysis was not occurring effectively at all
echelons
.
b9R.J. Mastrion, Director, Intelligence Study Group,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia
memorandum and attached Intelligence Study Group Findings,
3800 dated 18 Oct 91, TMD [photocopy], 13 (not numbered).
70Ibid., 16 (not numbered).
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2. Battle Rostering
After his experience in Southwest Asia, and later
while serving as the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, General Boomer stated that, "The greatest
deficiency I saw was that the MEF headquarters, as it was
organized for peacetime, was not sufficient to fight a large
campaign 24 hours a day for an indefinite period of time." 71
He also stated that:
We have now beefed up the MEF headquarters in terms of
people. But we can never give it every person in
peacetime that it should have in wartime. The way we're
taking care of this is through a battle roster program.
When some officers assume their jobs here at Quantico, for
example, they are also being assigned another one in
writing that says, 'You will be deployed to the I MEF in
this capacity if it goes to war, so start to study and
learn about your additional duty. Periodically, you're
going to exercise with them.' 7 '
This Battle Roster plan is designed to take care of
personnel deficiencies in a MEF T/O/'' In theory the only
71Goodman Jr. and Roos, 38.
72 Ibid.
7
'The various MEF headquarters have received both billets
and some personnel from the Marine Expeditionary Brigade
headquarters which have been disbanded as part of the overall
downsizing requirements mandated on the Marine Corps as part
of the DoD downsizing. In terms of intelligence personnel,
this has actually been rather transparent at the MEFs,
particularly since there is a concurrent effort to increase
the structure and manning of the former type commands FMFPAC
and FMFLANT into newly created Component Command Headquarters




way that it will help the all-source fusion analysis effort is
by filling all the other holes in the MEF G-2 section so
existing analysts from the MAFC can be essentially guaranteed
to remain in their analysis billets and not be pulled off to
other duties in the G-2, (if they have not been already in
garrison--see Current Situation/Initiatives below) . Of
course, all of this is dependent on the effectiveness of the
Battle Roster concept and that its actual implementation comes
close to meeting the actual personnel requirements of a MEF
headquarters preparing for contingency operations. Again, it
is not only the personnel numbers that count, but that those
who show up are the right rank to be effectively integrated in
a non-disruptive manner, and experienced in the duties of the
billet upon which they will be thrust. This whole concept is
problematic, but particularly so if the challenges and
difficulties of MEF G-2 analyst billets are considered.
Although the Marine Corps has chosen the Battle Roster
plan, at least in the short term, to solve personnel
deficiencies at the MEF HQ, Colonel Bruce Brunn, Marine Corps
Combat Development Center C4I Officer, outlined a number of
problems which limit the overall effectiveness of this
program. 74 Among these are that it does not adequately
"
4Bruce Brunn, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, C4I Officer,
interview by author, 24 March 1993, Handwritten notes, Marine
Corps Combat Development Center, Quantico, Virginia.
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address many of the other personnel requirements generated in
a MEF level contingency operation, i.e., Division, Wing, Force
Service Support Group; CINC and JTF augmentation (including
the Joint Intelligence Centers at each level); as well as
Liaison Officers for other services and agencies. When all
'these competing requirements for personnel augmentation arise
during crisis situations, there are just not nearly enough
personnel to go around. Additionally, because of the short
lead time in many actual crisis commitments, the battle roster
personnel will most often not show up in time to be available
to assist in predeployment intelligence support to Marines
preparing to deploy to the crisis area. This is the same
time when analysts are in short supply and great demand.
When questioned in the survey as to whether or not the
battle roster concept was a good solution to the undermanning
problem of the MEF G-2 sections, just over half the
respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed while 3 6 percent
agreed and only 3 percent strongly agreed. The majority of
those who agreed offered qualifying comments. They believed
that this should be just a short term solution. Of those who
disagreed, most felt that this was a "rob Peter to pay Paul"
approach and that the "team needs to be developed before the
game." The team effort of the entire G-2 has direct effects
on the efficiency and quality of all-source fusion analysis
produced as the result of that team effort. Battle rostering,
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or any other augmentation scheme does not promote an
efficient, coherent, overall intelligence effort , specifically
when it comes to all-source fusion analysis.
3. DoD Intelligence Reorganization
DoD intelligence reorganization initiatives had
'already started before Desert Storm as a result of the
collapse of the Soviet /Warsaw Pact threat in the late 1980s.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 1991
directed the Secretary of Defense, together with the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI), to conduct a joint review of
intelligence and intelligence-related activities to:
eliminate redundancy; strengthen joint intelligence
support to combatant commands; improve threat assessments
for acquisition programs; ensure that intelligence
priorities reflect the changed security environment; and
improve the responsiveness and utility of national
intelligence systems and organizations to the needs of
combatant commands. 75
Lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm significantly
affected the reorganization decisions made by DoD in response
to this directive from Congress.
The reorganization initiatives were wide ranging and
affected all facets of defense intelligence. That which most
directly affected all-source fusion analysis support to
7SSenate Armed Services Committee, "Report of Department
of Defense Organization and Management, " excerpt of, published
in American Intelligence Journal 12 (Autumn 1991) : 15.
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Marines was the decision that to best strengthen intelligence
support to combatant commanders, analysis centers of the
Unified and Specified Combatant Commands and their components
would be combined into Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) under
the control of designated Unified and Specified CINCs. 7 * The
U.S. Pacific command was cited as an example of how, over the
years, three separate processing and analysis centers had
existed to support USCINCPAC and the components." A Pacific
Command Joint Intelligence Center was formed and served as a
model for consolidation efforts within the other Unified and
Specified Commands. 78
Within the Department of the Navy, the Naval Maritime
Intelligence Center (NMIC) , was commissioned on 1 October
1991. It combined three former commands--CTF 168, the Naval
Technical Intelligence Center (NTIC) , and the Navy Operational
Intelligence Center (NOIC)
,
plus elements of the Naval
Intelligence Activity (NIA) . In a July 1992 report titled
cDuane Andrews, Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I),
"Restructuring Defense Intelligence, " American Intelligence
Journal 12 (Autumn 1991): 5.
77 Ibid, 6.
78Ibid. See same article for elaboration of similar
consolidations at U.S. European Command and U.S. Atlantic
Command. For a discussion of restructuring initiatives in
USCINCLANT, USCINCPAC, USCINCENT and the Office of Naval
Intelligence, see also U.S. Naval Intelligence Bulletin,
Summer 1992 for a series of articles in a Section titled
"Restructuring to Meet the Challenge."
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"Strategic Planning for The Office of Naval Intelligence:
Vision and Direction for the Future, " the Director of Naval
Intelligence Rear Admiral Edward D. Sheafer Jr., provided
visions and goals for ONI in maritime intelligence. Among the
points Admiral Sheafer made were the following:
* A major Defense Intelligence restructuring by which the
current, political, military and operational support
traditionally provided to U.S. Navy Commands and operating
forces by Fleet Intelligence Centers and Fleet Ocean
Surveillance Information Centers manned by the Navy is now
the responsibility of Joint Intelligence Centers manned by
Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel.
* ONI ' s ongoing intelligence role is now defined as
providing basic and background maritime intelligence for the
JICs; providing support to Department of the Navy RDT&E,
acquisition and training functions; providing maritime S&T
and general military intelligence support to many branches
of Government; and support for certain unique national level
programs
.
* The scope and focus of ONI are thus upon the broader
maritime intelligence vice naval intelligence, including
civilian as well as military activities as well as relevant
environmental and scientific and technical data.
* Apply all of ONI ' s national maritime intelligence
capabilities in the context of on-demand service to
consumers, vice products . ONI ' s primary focus shall be on
quality of service and timely response to consumer's
requests . 7q
While this Naval Intelligence reorganization serves several
purposes, not the least of which is refocusing from the former
Soviet naval threat to a broader maritime intelligence
79Edward D. Sheafer, Jr., Director of Naval Intelligence,
"Strategic Planning for the Office of Naval Intelligence:
Vision and Direction for the Future, " (Office of Naval
Intelligence: Suitland, Maryland, July 1992), 2,3.
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mission, capabilities for direct all-source fusion analysis
support to deployed Marines may actually decrease with the
potential loss of the dedicated naval intelligence support
traditionally provided by the likes of FOSIF Rota and FOSIF
WESTPAC Kamiseya.
While in the throes of intelligence reorganization at
all levels, the Marine Corps has continued to be employed in
numerous contingency operations. During all of these,
jointness has been the order of the day, with respective JICs
tasked with providing all-source fused analytical support to
Marine and other component commands, as well as Marines
themselves being put in the position to provide all-source
fused analytical support to joint forces.
4. Impact of Joint Operations
In the case of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia
during this past year, I MEF provided the JTF Headquarters
nucleus in Mogadishu, Somalia, including personnel to man the
JTF JIC. Earlier, during October and November 1991, II MEF
provided the JTF Headquarters nucleus for JTF-140 formed under
USCINCLANT for possible contingency operations in Haiti.
These recent forays into the joint operating arena have
provided additional lessons for the Marine Corps regarding our
ability to provide all-source fused analytical support.
The biggest lesson learned has been that with the
existing inadequate structure and low FMF manning levels, the
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difficult problem of simply flushing out a deploying MEF G-2
section is seriously exacerbated when there exists a
concurrent requirement to provide personnel to a JTF JIC.
Extensive personnel augmentation is required to man the
nucleus of a Joint Task Force JIC together with the added
requirements to man and operate a Marine Component Command
intelligence section (MEF or smaller) . While numbers vary
depending on the situation, the Marine Corps is only able to
satisfy the requirements by drawing not only from non-FMF
billets such as those identified in the Battle Roster plan,
but from numerous other noncommitted FMF units throughout the
Marine Corps. To say the least, this ad hoc method of
providing the requisite numbers of intelligence personnel is
not conducive to good intelligence work in general, and
specifically to all-source fusion analysis and production
efforts
.
As an example, during contingency preparations for the
crisis in Haiti, the 2d MAFC was tasked with providing the
personnel and much of the equipment to set up the nucleus of
the JTF JIC created to support JTF-140. Much of the effort
was focused on simply integrating other service personnel,
preparing for embarkation, and scrambling to provide basic
encyclopedic data (descriptive intelligence) . As a result, at
the JTF level, all-source fusion analytical effort was
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seriously degraded. 80 The USCINCLANT JIC did provide all-
source fused analytical support throughout the crisis period,
including a liaison team with direct connectivity back to the
CINCLANT JIC in Norfolk.
While official lessons learned from the I MEF Somalia
experience are still pending, initial assessments of the
intelligence effort there reflected that the number one
deficiency was inadequate intelligence structure, staffing
(manning), and training. The deployed MEF and Division
Headquarters G-2 sections required early and significant
personnel augmentation numbering over 250 personnel, including
analysts. Many of the augmenters arrived late and others were
not well suited to the mission at hand. One of the
augmenters, Major Steve Hasty, the OIC of the 3d MAFC in
Okinawa, related that, "Somalia once again underlined our need
for more and better trained analysts." Again, fortunately,
the MEF and JTF were thrust into a relatively benign
environment and had time to iron out the "wrinkles."
Although ongoing efforts to iron out joint doctrine
and issues such as forming and operating JTFs is proceeding,
the Marine Corps' contribution to the intelligence effort in
a joint environment will remain a major challenge simply in
terms of raw personnel numbers. Even in instances when
80Author's experience as the JTF-140 J-2 Operations
Officer.
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another service is responsible for forming the nucleus of a
JTF JIC, the Marine Corps still is tasked with providing
intelligence personnel, including analysts, to fill line
numbers in that organization. As long as JTFs remain ad hoc,
these joint billet personnel requirements will continue to sap
an already undermanned and overstretched Marine Corps
intelligence capability. All-source fusion and analysis in
these types of environments will remain a formidable
challenge, often requiring over dependence on higher echelon
all-source fusion efforts, at least initially, until the
personnel and organizational situation stabilizes. This
approach to intelligence support below the CINC level erodes
the potential direct all-source fusion analysis support
provided by Marines for Marines
.
5. Current Situation/Initiatives
In response to a United States Senate Committee on
Armed Services directive to submit a report for improving
Marine Corps intelligence capabilities, the Marine Corps
recently published an April 1993 document entitled "United
States Marine Corps Intelligence Roadmap." 81 The report
outlines overall deficiencies, progress, and planned actions
in the areas of manpower, education and training, and
"'Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "United States Marine
Corps Intelligence Roadmap 1993-1998," (Washington, D.C.:
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, C4I, April 1993), TMD
[photocopy] , 1-28 .
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equipment. The first conclusion is that manpower and
structure are the most critical deficiencies facing Marine
Corps intelligence today. A number of statistics are provided
that clearly reflect the extent of the problem:
* The 0202 MOS is experiencing critical shortfalls across
all grades and is projected to remain understaffed for the
foreseeable future.
* MOS 0231, Intelligence Analyst, the largest MOS for
enlisted personnel, is 16 percent understrength and is also
expected to remain understrength over the next few years
.
* The problem is more acute at specific grade levels. The
current inventory of 0202 Majors and Lieutenant Colonels
fills 68 percent and 77 percent of authorized billets,
respectively
.
The Roadmap cites, as an example of continuing demands,
the Intelligence Study Group report detailing the significant
structure and manning shortfalls within the Marine Corps,
while pointing out that in the past two years the Marine Corps
has been asked to fill an additional 21 officer and 27
enlisted intelligence-related external billets. These billets
include support to the newly formed JICs and other joint
organizations. The report also mentions increased staffing
requirements for the MCIC, NMIC, and the component command
staffs mentioned earlier.
The Roadmap offers a number of temporary solutions to
the personnel problem but concludes: "if the Marine Corps does
not seriously reexamine the internal and external intelligence
personnel requirements in light of future force drawdowns,
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organizational change, and burgeoning requirements in the
joint arena, such near term methods will be unsuccessful." 82
The Marine Corps is also developing a Marine Corps
Concept for Intelligence Support to Expeditionary Operations
to be published in the summer of 1993. It will provide the
philosophical basis for improving Marine Corps intelligence
capabilities in concert with the dynamic changes taking place
within the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, the
National Intelligence Community, and the world at large. 83
This concept will provide the foundation upon which Marine
Corps intelligence will most likely be restructured.
In the short term, the Marine Corps Intelligence
Activity continues to slowly expand its capabilities, in no
small part because of increased civilian analyst billets
authorized and paid for with GDIP money. However, focus will
remain on strategic level all-source fusion with ad hoc
contingency products developed as required.
Also in the short term, as a result of recommendations
from the Intelligence Study Group and other force structure
initiatives, the MAFC billets and T/0 line numbers have been
rolled into the MEF G-2 Section in a current proposed T/0





formal approval of this initiative, on 1 June 1992, 2d MAFC
personnel were assigned from the 2d SRI Group on an extended
temporary additional duty basis to II MEF G-2 . This has
simplified the working relationship between the MAFC and II
MEF G-2, but has eroded the MAFC ' s analytical capability.
Currently, as few as nine of the 24 2d MAFC personnel are
actually working as analysts. The rest are distributed
throughout the MEF G-2 to fill other functional billets in
targeting, plans, collections, administration, etc. 1st and
3d MAFCs are scheduled to fall under direct opcon of their
respective MEF G-2 sections as well, with similar results
likely
.
The Marine Corps is writing a prescription for failure
by staffing the MEF level all-source fusion organization,
which was designed to have 50 people, with as few as ten or
so. Ten people, even if they were the best ten the Marine
Corps had to offer, cannot read, process, fuse and analyze the
volume of traffic they should be receiving in garrison, let
alone what they would receive in a developing or actual
crisis .
Reorganization continues at all levels within DoD
Intelligence. The DIA has formed the National Military Joint
Intelligence Center (NMJIC) in Washington, D.C. among whose
tasks include all-source, fused, tailored, intelligence
support. Based on the survey responses, comments from Marines
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who have been exposed to NMJIC reporting reflect that this
organization is providing very useful all-source fused
intelligence support.
Theater JICs are also receiving generally favorable
comments. JCS is in the process of finalizing a joint
publication which will standardize doctrine for joint
intelligence support. 84
One of the costs to the Marine Corps associated with
the national and theater reorganization efforts is that over
the past two years, the Marine Corps has been asked to fill an
additional 21 officer and 27 enlisted intelligence-related
external billets. 3 - These requests have come during the same
time in which the Marine Corps Intelligence Study Group
identified the serious internal structural deficiencies
outlined above. While the Marine Corps fully supports the
move to jointness in the intelligence arena and views these
agencies as providing essential support to MAGTFs, these
billets must be filled at the expense of the FMF. dt
o4Tentative publication to be numbered and titled Joint
Pub 2-02, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for
Intelligence Support to Crisis Operations (U)
.
"
"Intelligence Roadmap, " 9.
86Ibid.
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D. SUMMARY AND QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
Manning and structure, respectively ranked number one and
two by the survey respondents, are the most serious factors
inhibiting Marine Corps all-source fusion efforts. This is
particularly true below service level. In a time of
increasing demands and commitments, the Marine Corps must make
some hard decisions on where the focus of main effort will be
for all-source fused, tailored intelligence support for Marine
operating forces. Although the efforts at the national and
theater levels are encouraging in respect to levels and
quality of all-source fused analysis support to operating
forces, one of the most serious deficiencies when relying on
national and theater level all-source fused analysis support
is that tactical level information and reporting is not
included in the all-source fusion analysis. Given the
realities of jointness, and a host of other considerations,
the Marine Corps must determine how to best structurally
organize and man to optimize all-source fusion analysis
support to Marine operating forces.
The first substantive questions in the survey
questionnaire were designed directly or indirectly to measure
current views related to intelligence structure and manning
issues. Generalizations follow with the detailed total
percentages available in the Appendix.
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1. Impact of Structure and Manning
When asked, "Overall, what do you think most inhibits
our ability to best do all-source fused intelligence
analysis?", respondents were asked to rank order six factors.
Manning levels was ranked number one and structural
impediments was ranked number two.
2. Marine All-Source Fusion at What Levels
When asked, "With the current intelligence structure
and manning, true, all-source fused intelligence analysis is
accomplished at what level (s)?", the leading responses were 65
percent MEF level; 42 percent MEU level; and 37 percent
Service level (Marine Corps Intelligence Activity) . The high
response rate for the MEU level reflects the common knowledge
amongst Marines that deployed MEUs are at the "pointy tip of
the spear" and receive some of the very best intelligence
personnel, equipment, and other miscellaneous support.
When asked, "Realistically, at what level (s) should we
strive to develop a true, all-source fused intelligence
analysis capability?" The response reflected a concern for
the MSCs
. The top three responses were: 77 percent MEF
level; 59 percent MEU level; and 43 percent Division/Wing
level. Service level was named by only 27 percent.
3. Increases in All-Source Fused Intelligence
When asked, "Have any of the recent past/current
intelligence reorganization initiatives increased the level of
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all-source fused intelligence support your unit/echelon has
received?" The number one response, with 3 5 percent, was
Theater JICs . Second, was "Not Apparent, " cited by 3 3 percent
of the respondents. Third, was MAGTF All-Source Fusion
Centers with 27 percent, followed by the Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity with 20 percent.
4. MAFCs as Positive Step
Given the statement, "The creation of the MAGTF All-
Source Fusion Centers at each SRIG was overall a positive step
toward enhancing Marine Corps capabilities to produce all-
source fused, tailored intelligence, " the respondents were
asked to agree or disagree. Two thirds strongly agreed or
agreed while only a fourth disagreed or strongly disagreed.
Eight percent had no opinion.
5. JICs as Improvement to All-Source Fusion
Given the statement, "The recent emphasis on Joint
Intelligence Centers at the Theater and Joint Task Force
levels as the focal point for all-source fusion/one-stop shop
intelligence support for operating forces will improve all-
source fused, tailored intelligence analysis support to Marine
forces," again the respondents were asked to agree or
disagree. 60.5 percent strongly agreed or agreed while 28.6
percent disagreed or strongly disagreed. 8.8 percent had no
opinion and there was no response from 2 . percent
.
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6. Manning Priority Change Affect
Given the statement, "All-source fused intelligence
support to Marine forces would be improved if manning
priorities changed to emphasize manning of FMF intelligence
billets at the expense of external billets/supporting
establishment billets," opinion was evenly divided, with 43
percent strongly agreeing or agreeing and 45 percent
disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. Surprisingly, the
response differences of opinion were evenly spread between
those officers in joint billets, non-FMF supporting
establishment billets and FMF billets. No clear trends
emerged except the largest single response was disagree with
3 6 percent. Those that disagreed more often commented on the
value of having Marines in joint billets both to influence the
support provided to Marines from external intelligence




IV. TRAINING AND EDUCATION
When serving as future intelligence officers they
understand that training, particularly intelligence
training, is going to be their primary function in the
postwar Army. Moreover, this enthusiasm reflects the
common opinion of these experienced soldiers that
intelligence training was not conducted with maximum
effectiveness before and during World War II; and that
this phase of training must be conducted more efficiently
in the event of future war.
LtCols Robert R. Glass and Phillip B. Davidson 5
"
...and implicit in this changing threat is the requirement
to train and educate all of our Marines, especially our
intelligence specialists, to respond to these non-
traditional challenges.
General Alfred M. Gray 8 '
A. INTRODUCTION
No other aspect of military intelligence is more difficult
yet more important to the entire process than analysis and
all-source fusion. Yet Marine Corps intelligence officers
receive little formal training or education in intelligence
analysis. Like the other factors identified in this thesis,
the general lack of specific training and education in all-
source fusion analysis is simply a symptom of a much larger
37Glass and Davidson, 123. Chapter 10 of their book
Intelligence is for Commanders is entitled "Intelligence
Training" and cites lessons learned from the experiences of
World War II
.
&&Gray, "Global Intelligence Challenges in the 1990's,"
4.
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disease--the lack of overall intelligence training and
education. Not only is formal school training and education
insufficient, but garrison and field training come up short as
well. This chapter examines a number of training and
education factors, both formal and informal, which affect the
overall ability of Marine intelligence analysts to conduct
all-source fusion analysis. Some current Headquarters Marine
Corps initiatives relating to Marine Corps intelligence
training are also examined to assess the potential impact on
all-source fusion intelligence analysis capabilities.
B. FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION
1. Can You Teach Intelligence Analysis?
There are those who say that analysis cannot be
taught--that it is an art rather than a science. Yet the
Marine Corps teaches the art of war at all levels of its
professional military education program. The art of
intelligence analysis can also be taught to the degree that
any art can be taught. There are also any number of basic
skills of analysis which can be taught. In his research on
intelligence analysis while attending the Defense Intelligence
College in 1983, Marine Major James D. Hammond concluded that
all analysts early in their careers (preferably before their
first analytical assignment), should be required to take a
course devoted to basic analysis where they would be exposed
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to certain basic analytical skills/topics. 89 Although the
focus of his research was at the strategic level, the
following skills/topics he identified are equally applicable
to the conduct of intelligence analysis and all-source fusion
at operational and tactical levels: orientation to analysis
as it fits in the intelligence cycle; oral and written
communication skills; 90 research skills ;'n psychology of
analysis including personal values, perceptions, prejudices,
biases, and other social and cultural considerations; problem
solving skills; reasoning and logic skills; analytic
methodologies; and practical considerations for analysts, a
seminar type exposure discussion opportunity with experienced
analysts to discuss the balance between theory and "real
world" aspects of analysis. 92
89Hammond, 28.
90Navy Lieutenant Commander Sara Scott, the Defense
Intelligence College Intelligence Analyst Program Manager
responsible for analyst training at the Defense Intelligence
College, told the author in a 25 March 1993 interview that the
students she taught in the various analysis courses had "weak,
pathetic, abysmal writing skills."
91While "research" may appear to be a simple concept,
intelligence research can be extremely complicated depending
at what echelon the analyst is at and what type intelligence
product is required. For the most comprehensive examination




Pennsylvania: HRB-Singer, Inc., 1976).
92Hammond, 27-3 5.
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Another excellent discussion of the qualities or
facets involved in the process of operational intelligence
analysis from a Navy perspective is found in "Some Thoughts
for Naval Intelligence Officers" by Captain F. P. Notz USN.
His list includes experience; initiative and intuition;
action/reaction; coincidence; anomalies; pattern analysis;
time line analysis; track analysis; quantitative analysis;
probability analysis; and comparative analysis. 95 While
qualities like experience and initiative and intuition cannot
be taught, the other concepts and processes listed by Captain
Notz can be and are taught.
2 . Formal Training
The Defense Intelligence College offers a number of
specific intelligence analysis training courses including a
three week intelligence analyst course, a two week counterdrug
intelligence analysis course, and a two week counterterrorism
analysis course." 4 Although tailored more for strategic
level analysis, these courses have received much praise from
the few Marine officers and enlisted who have had the
opportunity to attend one or more.
53F.P. Notz, "Some Thoughts For Naval Intelligence
Officers, November 1988" TMs [photocopy], pp. 31-34.
" 4Defense Intelligence College, Catalog—Academic Year
1992-1993
, (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence College,
1992), 74-77. See also page 156 for a listing of analysis
courses which are taught as part of the Postgraduate and
Undergraduate Intelligence Programs taught there.
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Intelligence analysis and all-source fusion are
complex processes but there are any number of facets and
components within these processes which can be and are
formally taught. The question is, how many of our Marine
officers receive specific formal training or education in
analysis and/or all-source fusion?
Marine Officers attending the Marine Air Ground Task
Force Intelligence Officer (Basic) Course taught at the Navy
and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) receive
a comprehensive introduction to Marine Corps tactical
intelligence. The emphasis is almost exclusively on tactical
level processing and analysis skills. 9f'
When asked to list any specific or general analytical
training they had received that directly contributes to their
abilities as analysts, only six of the 147 officers named
specific military intelligence analysis courses: five
analysis courses at the Defense Intelligence College (four as
a part of the Post Graduate Intelligence Program, and one not
clearly defined) and one mention of a deception course offered
by the CIA. Also mentioned twice was the Army Intelligence
Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and the MAGTF Intelligence
" 5U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine Air Ground Task Force
Intelligence Officer (Basic) Course (4210) 1-93 Outline of
Instruction, 1993" TMs [photocopy], Navy and Marine Corps




Officer Course at NMITC was mentioned once. Although many
other courses were mentioned, the only strong trend was
reference to college and military /other U.S. Government area
studies courses. When asked if there were any general or
specific analysis courses they would recommend, the only
trends were again for DIA offered courses and various regional
or area studies courses such as the regional familiarity
courses taught by the U.S. Air Force at Hurlburt Field,
Florida. Of the 147 respondents, 137 had attended the Marine
Corps Basic Intelligence Officer course at one time or
another, and 35 had attended the Post Graduate Intelligence
Program at the Defense Intelligence College or its
predecessor, the Defense Intelligence School.
Clearly, other than the Defense Intelligence College,
there are few analysis specific formal training courses
available for Marine intelligence analysts.
As mentioned above, area studies and area familiarity
were mentioned as generalized education which would benefit
all-source fusion and analysis. Other services, particularly
the Army, have a fully developed Foreign Area Officer (FAO)
Program to provide officers specifically trained as area
"experts." The Marine Corps also has a FAO program with
formal study programs oriented toward four areas: Middle
East/North Africa (Arabic) ; Far East (Chinese/Thai/Korean)
;
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Former Soviet Union (Russian); and Latin America (Spanish). 4 '
The program is open to applicants from all MOS ' s and annually
selects two individuals for each of the four areas who then
take language training followed by a year of overseas study.
Marine Corps intelligence officers are able to apply for this
program. While one might expect that a fairly large number
would be selected, such is not the case. For example, of the
147 respondents, only 15 have been designated Foreign Area
Officers as a secondary or tertiary MOS. Although there are
many reasons for the low number of FAOs in the Marine Corps,
not the least of which is the expense in training them, it is
often suggested that more FAOs assigned to intelligence
analysis billets would enhance Marine Corps analytical
capabilities. Survey respondents indicated by a ratio of
nearly nine to one that more intelligence officers trained as
FAOs and assigned to analyst billets would enhance Marine
Corps abilities relative to all-source intelligence analysis.
By a smaller three to one ratio, the respondents indicated
that such would also be the case with more non-intelligence
officers trained and assigned to intelligence analysis
billets. While there were not many specific comments offered
by the respondents, several indicated concern over the need to
9faHeadquarters
, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order
1520. IIP, Foreign Area Officer Program
, C4I, 31 Dec 1992.
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train non-intelligence FAOs the intelligence business before
they could become fully effective: 97
I work with Army FAOs daily. They routinely require two
years OJT to become effective analysts.
(Capt, DIA)
While area expertise is helpful, it is only one of several
skills needed to be an effective intelligence analyst.
Instead of needing months to learn his area, the non-
intelligence FAO would need months to learn intelligence
mechanics
.
(Maj , FAO student)
The key may be to assign the non-intelligence FAOs to
intelligence billets where their area expertise can be
utilized while at the same time they are "helped" with the
intelligence aspects of the billet by other more experienced
intelligence officers within the organization. The MAFCs
would be a logical place for the assignment of FAOs, both
intelligence and/or non-intelligence. Assignments of FAOs is
addressed again in the next chapter.
3 . On The Job Training
Those associated with the intelligence business
acknowledge that regardless of any amount or quality of formal
97The author shares these concerns based on his three year
experience as a Soviet ground forces analyst at Headquarters,
U.S. European Command working side by side on a daily basis
with three Army non-intelligence Russian FAOs. For an
excellent examination of the various military service FAO
programs, including criticism of the Marine Corps program, see
Randy P. Burkett, Captain, USAF, "The Training and Employment
of Area Specialists in the Military" (Masters Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1989).
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education and training, there is no substitute for experience
and "on the job training (OJT) " when it comes to intelligence
work in general, and specifically to intelligence analysis and
all-source fusion. Unfortunately, in most Marine Corps
intelligence organizations, the opportunity to do all-source
fusion with the same types and quantities of information
required in crises just does not happen day-to-day. Even
without all the organic tactical information collected during
actual combat operations, there are many other sources of raw
data and information that analysts could have access to, but
generally do not, on a daily basis to assist in their training
and understanding of "all-source" information.
Despite the creation of the MAFCs, many of the
respondents said that they had never really performed "all-
source fusion" until they were assigned to a theater or
national level analysis billet. Then it was primarily
learning by doing and experience "on the job." Given the
aforementioned paucity of formal analytical training and
education, OJT is the primary mechanism for learning all-
source fusion analysis in the Marine Corps as well. Although
the lower the echelon, the less complex the "analysis and all-
source fusion" tasks and responsibilities in general, these
processes are accomplished in one form or another at all
levels during crises. If Marines are not formally schooled
or trained effectively to accomplish these processes, then the
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alternative must be on the job training. When asked, "As an
occupational field, how well do we provide on the job training
for 0202's and 0231's (enlisted analysts) relative to all-
source fusion and analysis?" the survey responses were not
encouraging. None said extremely well; only 1.4 percent said
very well; only 15.6 percent said adequately; 49 percent said
not very well; and 32 percent said poorly. Two percent had no
opinion
.
Although there may be many explanations for this, the
most plausible is that as difficult and rare as it is to
receive formal training or education in analysis and all-
source fusion, it naturally follows that there are few trained
and skilled officers or enlisted available to provide the OJT
in the first place. Secondly, for those few who may have the
skills, education, and experience to provide this type
training, any number of other factors prevent this from being
realized. Some of these other factors include the low overall
manning levels already addressed, as well as assignment policy
and billet requirements addressed in the next chapter. If
analysts are not required or able to do the basics of analysis
in day-to-day garrison activities, including all the basic
processing skills and some levels of analysis, these skills
atrophy or never fully develop in the first place. OJT starts
in garrison, not in a crisis.
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OJT occurs in many other aspects of intelligence
work--simply not skills and training directly related to
analysis and all-source fusion. The exceptions to this
observation are Marines in joint analyst billets and those at
the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. 98 MAFC analysts in
all three MEFs do have a certain amount of increased access to
all-source information due to their echelon, however, chronic
personnel shortages and other focuses of effort seriously
dilute opportunities for analysis and all-source fusion OJT
while in garrison. With limited opportunities for realistic
operational and tactical level all-source fusion analysis
training in garrison, what are the opportunities for realistic
training during unit training evolutions, command post
exercises (CPXs) , or field training exercises (FTXs)?
4. Exercises
First, outside of MOS school, the Marine Corps
conducts virtually no "intelligence-specific" training
exercises related to all-source fusion and analysis. This has
98Kann Dolan, GS-14, Chief, Threat Analysis Branch,
interview by author, 24 March 1993, Handwritten notes, Marine
Corps Intelligence Activity, Quantico, Virginia. Ms. Dolan
emphatically stated that all-source fusion was accomplished at
MCIA, although it was a difficult prospect given all the
requirements together with the organization still growing in
terms of numbers of analysts. However, all Marine Corps
analysts assigned to MCIA were experienced, and civilian
analysts were hired only after careful screening. Several of
the civilian analysts are former Marine Corps intelligence




often been mentioned as a goal of many of the author's fellow
Marine Corps intelligence professionals (officer and
enlisted) . But given the shortages of personnel, other
commitments, and lack of command emphasis, this is unlikely to
happen any time in the foreseeable future. Another
opportunity for realistic all-source fusion analysis training
is during CPXs and FTXs . Again, reality generally dictates
otherwise. This fact was supported by the survey respondents
who when asked, "During CPXs and field exercises, how often is
realistic all-source fusion analytical intelligence training
integrated into the exercise?", only 1.4 percent (2 officers
associated with Marine Expeditionary Units) said very often;
6 percent said often; 20 percent said sometimes; 60 percent
said seldom; 11 percent said never; and 2 percent failed to
respond.
Nearly every respondent made a comment on this
emotionally charged issue. The following generalizations
gleaned from the comments provide a feel for their concerns.
Again, like so many other observations, the comments apply to
not just analysis and all-source fusion, but to intelligence
in general. The most common observation, and one that is
certainly no revelation, is that exercises, be they CPXs or
FTXs, are designed primarily to accomplish any number of
training objectives other than the training of intelligence
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personnel. The 1991 Intelligence Study Group (ISG) had
resurfaced this continuing problem by noting:
Current Marine Corps training in CPX/FTX situations
falsely represents intelligence capabilities. In order to
ensure the smooth flow of other training evolutions,
intelligence has usually been virtually all-inclusive and
readily obtained. In reality, intelligence amounts to
information which has been stolen from the enemy; it is
not easy to obtain and will usually be of limited scope.
For too long, realistic training has been sacrificed to
ensure certain specific training objectives were obtained.
CPX/FTX events must be made more realistic even if that
means certain key events may not take place."
Officers at all levels mentioned that despite some
pronouncements that "intelligence drives ops," the reality
is most often the reverse. Several exceptions were noted,
specifically at the MEU level within the Marine Corps and at
some major theater level exercises.
Another commonly expressed concern was that we (Marine
Corps Intelligence) often tend to put our least experienced
people in the exercise control groups, holding back our most
experienced personnel to be the "players." 100 Effective
"Mastrion, 3 (pages not numbered)
.
100For virtually every exercise at all levels of the
Marine Corps and in the joint and national arenas, exercise
control groups are formed some time prior to the actual
exercise. Almost without exception, the exercise control
group requires exercise participants to contribute personnel
to serve in the control group as either scriptors of exercise
traffic (data, messages, event lists, etc.) some time in
advance of the exercise. Commands are generally unwilling to
give up their "best" people to be "lost" for any timeframe
prior to an exercise. In Marine Corps intelligence, chronic
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scripting of realistic intelligence traffic (raw information)
across all the disciplines (ints described in Chapter II), in
both terms of quantity and quality, is a very manpower
intensive and time consuming process even with vastly
experienced exercise control group personnel. Without the
proper investment in the exercise control group, improperly
formatted or abbreviated intelligence messages often result,
further diluting the training benefit for all-source fusion
analysts. When this is the case, most "intel" messages are
"canned" to fit a scenario which will drive the other exercise
training objectives. Many of the questionnaire respondents
complained of the strong tendency to receive "canned" message
traffic with little need or opportunity for actual analysis.
The unrealistically few intelligence messages input into the
scenario are often "wheat" designed to drive the exercise play
in a predetermined direction. Only in the most sophisticated
scenarios, almost exclusively at the higher echelons, are
there many "chaff" messages thrown in and then, nowhere near
the amount of chaff an analyst is faced with in actual crisis
situations. The net result is that analysts are spoon fed
"intelligence," many times with only one message from one
personnel shortages already strain most units and they are
accordingly not willing to "play" the actual exercise with all
the attention it commands without their best players. Hence,
generally less experienced personnel are sent to augment the
exercise control groups.
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source that they need to use without further analysis or cross
cuing of additional collection assets to confirm or deny the
information's validity. Failure to use that one bit of
"intelligence" often results in missing the "picture" the
exercise control group is trying to paint to drive the rest of
the exercise participants.
Overall, exercises are all too often just not
sophisticated enough from an intelligence standpoint to force
the analysts to do real analysis. When not forced to
scrutinize the information received for pertinence,
credibility, etc., the analysts suffer in two major ways. One
they do not learn how to deal with "real" types and quantities
of raw reporting. Two, operators and even some intelligence
personnel fail to develop an appreciation for just how
difficult all-source fusion intelligence analysis is to
accomplish, and they become accustomed to having the
intelligence puzzle conveniently put together with nearly all
the necessary pieces to "see" the puzzle.
When faced with a deluge of actual crisis intelligence
message traffic and other raw information in the proper, often
lengthy and more complicated formats emerging from "sources"
and types of reporting with which the analysts are unfamiliar,
all-source fusion analysts' learning curves get very steep at
a time when many other distractions also detract from the all-
source fusion effort.
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Even in those few exercises which attempt to provide
realistic intelligence "play, " at the MEF/MAFC and MSC level
levels in particular, other factors erode whatever other
limited all-source fusion analysis training opportunities may
exist. These factors include not enough personnel to
- accomplish all other intelligence related tasks as well as not
enough experienced personnel available to work as analysts.
Another factor worth particular mention is the effort
to keep exercise scenarios unclassified in some instances
(most often at lower echelons) , and often only at the GENSER
SECRET level. For analysts at echelons below Division and
Wing levels the GENSER SECRET level is appropriate. However,
exercises at this level are not uncommon at the Division/Wing
level and MEF level, particularly for CPXs . Although this
makes the exercise administratively and logistically easier
for both scriptors and players, special intelligence
information is either not integrated at all or is "sanitized"
to GENSER level for ease of use and dissemination. Special
intelligence (SI) reporting is extremely valuable for the
conduct of all-source fusion analysis, and is not generally
effectively integrated in Marine Corps intelligence scenarios.
Again, MEUs are the general exception to this observation
because of the Marine Corps' expenditure in assets to man,
train, and equip these units at the "tip of the spear." With
few other exceptions, notably some rare MEF level exercises,
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these efforts to keep the classification level down in Marine
Corps CPXs and FTXs is counterproductive to the effective
training of all-source fusion analysts.
Of final note, the Marine Corps participates in very,
very few force-on-f orce live play exercises. Many of the
respondents pointed out that this type exercise play would
provide the most challenging and realistic all-source analysis
training possible. Given many constraints, not the least of
which is budgetary, any improvement in this regard is also
unlikely
.
C. CURRENT SITUATION/ INITIATIVES
The Intelligence Roadmap mentioned in Chapter III,
articulates a number of challenges ahead for the education and
training of Marine Corps intelligence personnel. Those that
will affect all-source fusion analysis capability include the
decision to start sending 70 percent of all Marine
Intelligence Officers selected for career level school
(Captains/0-3) to the Army Military Intelligence Officers
Advanced Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. 1 : This 20-week
course's focus is all-source intelligence. The course was
revised and redesigned in 1990 and 1991 to correct two major




all-source level, and a failure to properly teach predictive
analysis and synthesis. 102
The Roadmap also noted that:
The Army used Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
(IPB) to great effect during Operation Desert Storm, and
post-war analysis indicated that it could easily be
adapted to Marine Corps operational requirements. The
DIRINT (Marine Corps Director of Intelligence) directed
the incorporation of IPB into the NMITC curriculum and
this was initiated during the summer of 1992. IPB has
also been incorporated into the curriculum at AWS
(Amphibious Warfare School) and Command and Staff College
at Quantico. 103
IPB is a planning and analysis process developed and used by
the Army to aid the commander and staff in determining where
and when to use limited resources to achieve decisive results.
There are intelligence portions of this overall staff planning
process which can be very useful in visualizing and predicting
enemy activity with heavy utilization of graphic aids
102Robert B. Mangold, Colonel, U.S. Army, "The New
Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, " Military
Intelligence 18 (Jan-Mar 1992): 32. See also Wayne M. Hall,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, "Intelligence Analysis in the
21st Century, " Military Intelligence 18 (Jan-Mar 1992) : 8, for
an extensive explanation of the author's concept of
intelligence synthesis versus intelligence analysis. In
short, the explanation offers that analysis is the pulling
apart and examining of each of a number of parts, while
synthesis is putting pieces of information together into a
coherent meaningful whole, the parts of which fit together,
and from that, making predictions. This is what is referred
to in this paper as all-source fusion analysis, the end
product of which should always be a predictive capability.
103,, Intelligence Roadmap," 15.
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primarily in the form of maps and overlays. 104 Although it
is useful as a tool for the Marine Corps, the intelligence
portions can be very manpower intensive. As noted by USMC
Management Analyst Robert Steele:
In the case of the Army, personnel structure has been
provided at the corps and division levels to support the
labor-intensive IPB process. The same is not true of the
Marine Corps, where intelligence structure is not only
austere, but intelligence manning is severely constrained
(not enough "faces" to fill too few "spaces")....
...Our commitment to the IPB process is worth stressing.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, addressing the Marine
Corps Command and Staff College on 15 August 1991, stated
that the Marine Corps would "do IPB." Our implementation
of this direction has focused on ensuring that Marines
understand the process and develop the products, but also
strive to meet the substantive needs of the commander for
fused analysis. IPB is not a substitute for analysis. 105
The Army has five intelligence personnel for every one in the
Marine Corps. 10b Since Marine Corps analysts have difficulty
efficiently processing information with some analysis, the
ability to "do IPB" effectively, after a crisis has developed,
is in serious question. Although there are many positive
aspects of the IPB process, not the least of which is
:04The Army has a complete doctrinal manual on this
process: FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield dated May 1989. There is a current initial draft
update of the same manual dated February 1993 expanding the
applications of the process to most aspects of contemporary
joint military involvement.
105Robert David Steele, 6.
106Bill Philbin, Major, U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters
Marine Corps Intelligence MOS Specialist, phone interview by
author, 25 May 1993, Handwritten notes.
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developing a closer operations/intelligence relationship, at
division/wing or MEF levels, there just are not enough
intelligence personnel to do the mechanical processes involved
let alone the analysis and all-source fusion that should be
accompanying it. Finally, it is one thing to go through the
motions of IPB in a static, less than challenging CPX/FTX, but
quite another within the context of a developing or actual
crisis situation.
A number of other initiatives are outlined in the Roadmap
including efforts to design and improve intelligence training
during exercises. The report cited one specific "fusion
related" accomplishment :
Integration of national systems support into Marine
Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS-1) training
exercises at Yuma, Arizona, where fused information from
national, theater, and tactical collectors provided
intelligence support to air crews in these exercises. 107
Several of the survey respondents also cited this particular
training as an example of specific analysis training they had
received, and would recommend. Unfortunately, this type
training is only available to a small percentage of Marine
Corps intelligence personnel and is focused at aviation
intelligence, only one aspect of the multidimensional all-




The Roadmap also cites plans to improve Marine Corps
intelligence exercise training by encouraging commanders to
conduct more " force-on-force" exercises that allow for free
flow of events. At the same time, however, the report notes
that Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds to support
training and exercises have been reduced making it
increasingly important to better integrate intelligence
training into every exercise. To say the least, this
situation is problematic.
This cut in funding of O&M monies is accompanied by other
budget cuts which have affected the amount of money available
for non-MOS producing training and education. The net effect
of these cuts is that there is much less money available for
"short course" training such as the specific analysis and area
familiarity courses mentioned earlier. Further anticipated
budget constraints do not bode well for funding these type
courses for Marine analysts. Headquarters Marine Corps is
working to identify special training requirements tied to
specific T/0 billets. This proposal could go a long way in
identifying specific analysis and/or area familiarity course
training requirements for analyst billets, particularly for an
organization like the MAFC . However, even if identified and
formalized, the money to pay for the training must be
forthcoming or the initiative will bear no fruit, and analysts
will be no better trained than they are today.
99
D. CONCLUSIONS
Marine Corps intelligence officers receive little formal
training specifically in intelligence analysis unless offered
the opportunity to attend the Defense Intelligence College.
With that opportunity significantly reduced, and with
budgetary constraints likely to further reduce the opportunity
to attend the several "short courses" which teach analysis,
Marine intelligence officers will have to rely on service
intelligence schools for whatever initial and follow-on formal
all-source fusion analysis training they are likely to
receive
.
The prognosis for area familiarity training is likewise
poor. Despite the attractiveness of more FAOs to enhance all-
source fusion capabilities, with no anticipated changes in the
FAO program, more FAOs are unlikely. Funding for area
familiarity courses has already been cut severely, also
reducing an avenue to educate all-source fusion analysts.
OJT is not effectively occurring except in joint or other
external billets, and exercises are generally not providing
realistic all-source fusion training.
The Marine Corps has acknowledged serious deficiencies in
intelligence training overall, and is aggressively attempting
to rectify the situation. All intelligence training and
education must emphasize that the ultimate goal of the entire
intelligence effort is to be able to provide all-source fused,
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tailored intelligence to support Marine forces and other joint
forces as required. Until this happens, all-source fusion
analysis skills will remain weak at best.
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V. EXPERIENCE LEVEL AND ASSIGNMENTS
Do we look at previous analytic training or experience
before assigning officers to analyst billets? An
officer's previous analytical experience doesn't even
break the noise level (when it comes to assignments)
.
Anonymous 108
Inexperienced intelligence officers often lack the
knowledge to harvest timely information from national
sources as well as tactical sources.
Colonel Donald L. Kerrick 105
You can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.
Unknown
A. INTRODUCTION
Experience level and assignment policy are two additional
factors which affect the all-source fusion analytical effort.
Linked together, they were ranked by the survey respondents as
the third leading impediment to the accomplishment of all-
source fusion analysis. The general manpower shortage
problems addressed previously, coupled with a tendency to
assign the more experienced and qualified intelligence
officers to external billets have a very significant impact on
101 An officer at Headquarters Marine Corps
'Donald L. Kerrick, Colonel, U.S. Army, "5 Rules for the
Intelligence Officer, " Military Intelligence 16 (Oct-Dec
1990) : 36.
102
the ability to accomplish all-source fusion analysis.
Furthermore, assignment policies and constraints also limit
the specific regional focus and accompanying experience which
otherwise would enhance the all-source fusion analytical
effort
.
B . BACKGROUND /FACTORS
1. Intelligence Personnel Initial Selection Criteria
Although all-source fusion analysis is but one of the
many responsibilities of an intelligence specialist, it is by
far one of the most difficult skills to learn. And yet, does
the Marine Corps carefully screen personnel before they come
into the intelligence MOS to determine if the "right stuff" or
aptitude exists in that person to allow them to go on and be
a good intelligence professional in general and specifically
a good analyst? The only two requirements/prerequisites
currently to become an intelligence officer are:
* Must be eligible for access to sensitive compartmented
information based on a special background investigation.
* Complete MAGTF Intelligence Officer Course, Navy Marine
Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) , Dam Neck,
Virginia. 110
For enlisted intelligence specialists/analysts, MOS 0231, the
only particular requirements/prerequisites are:
* GT (aptitude) score of 100 or higher.
U0Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order
P1200.7M Military Occupational Specialties Manual , 12 March
1993, 1-6.
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* Complete the Intelligence Specialist Course (entry level),
NMITC, Dam Neck, Virginia.
* Must be eligible for access to sensitive compartmented
information based on a completed special background
investigation
.
* Types a minimum of 25 words per minute. 111
With the exception of eligibility for the special access
security clearance, and the 25 words per minute typing skill
for enlisted analysts, there are no other particular
qualifications required. There are also no other formal
mechanisms for intelligence personnel to screen 0202 's and
0231 's coming into the respective specialties. Once a Marine
completes the MOS school at NMITC, they are considered
qualified to fill any intelligence billet commensurate to his
or her rank. With no other screening than this, many officers
and enlisted end up in analyst billets without the necessary
aptitude or experience to handle the job. Another enlisted
intelligence MOS, 0211, Counterintelligence (CI) Specialist,
has more stringent requirements/prerequisites including:
* Must be interviewed by a screening board of CI personnel
in accordance with MCO 3850. 1_.
* Must possess a GT of 110 or higher.
* Must display command of the English language through both
oral and written communication.




There is every reason to believe that greater selectivity
criteria such as this should be applied to the selection of
0202's and 0231's as well.
At one time or another, all 0202 's and 0231 's are called
upon to do all-source fusion analysis. Yet, the necessary
complex mental reasoning processes skills are not skills for
which all people have a strong aptitude. Additionally, strong
reading speed and comprehension skills, and writing and verbal
communication skills are vital to the success of personnel
engaged in all-source fusion analysis. Many Marine Corps
intelligence officers and enlisted personnel have poor
communication skills, and this seriously shackles the all-
source fusion analysis effort. Those few who can write well
get diverted from all-source fusion analysis and put into the
production and dissemination business.
While measuring aptitude for analysis work is somewhat
problematic, communication and reasoning skills are measured
in tests like the Law School Aptitude Test (LSAT) . The Marine
Corps administers the Defense Language Aptitude Battery test
to all Marines who desire to be selected for foreign language
training. The Marine Corps could go a long way toward
improving all-source fusion if more stringent screening and
tougher prerequisites were mandated for personnel coming into
the 0202 and 0231 MOS ' s , possibly including some type of
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specific aptitude test designed to measure reading, oral and
written communication, and basic reasoning skills.
2. Assignment Policy and Assignments
As in every MOS , approximately one third of all Marine
Corps intelligence officers are reassigned permanent change of
station (PCS) every three years. The process of identifying
which officers go to which billets is accomplished by the
coordinated efforts of two branches at Headquarters Marine
Corps. The Manpower Branch (MMOA) has the responsibility of
actually making the final decisions and approving and issuing
individuals' assignment orders. In the case of Marine Corps
intelligence officers these decisions are coordinated with
input and recommendations from the Headquarters Marine Corps
MOS Specialist for 02's (Intelligence). As explained in
Chapter III, all external billets are considered "excepted"
and are required to be filled at 100 percent. Some of these
external billets are nominative and there is a list of general
and/or specific qualifications that the officer designated to
fill the billet should optimally meet. This, plus the general
demands of the billet, are factors which dictate which Marine
from the pool of "available" officers will be slated for
assignment to that billet. The Marine Corps makes every
effort to send its best available qualified personnel to these
external billets. In general, these are the only intelligence
officers or enlisted specifically screened by Headquarters
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Marine Corps prior to assignment to analyst billets. Officers
and enlisted assigned to the FMF are simply assigned against
the staffing goal "proportionate share" billet number
requirements of various major commands. Once an individual
reports to the command, he is assigned to a specific billet by
that command. There are no billets in the Marine Corps
specifically coded for individuals with specific analysis
skills or experience. If an individual shows up at a command
with particular analysis experience or area expertise, it is
often largely by chance. While the assignment monitors at
Headquarters Marine Corps attempt to place qualified people in
appropriate assignments, an individual's analytical experience
is usually not a factor considered unless the individual
specifically identifies himself for a particular billet based
on some particular expertise. Then, many other factors like
rank, availability, "career progression," etc., usually weigh
in more heavily in the final decision. The assignment
monitors face an uphill struggle just matching faces to
spaces, let alone worrying about whether or not some
individual has "analysis" skills or background. 11 '
When questioned whether they had ever been assigned to
a specific permanent or temporary intelligence billet because
of any unique characteristic or experience related to specific
11JThe author's monitor is responsible for over 1100
Ground Combat Service Support Majors in 17 MOS ' s
.
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analytical expertise, training, or education (including
foreign language capability) only 3 percent of the survey
respondents indicated that they had. However of that 3
percent, when they listed the billets or assignments, only
about one third could be described as "related to any specific
analytical expertise, training or education." This reflects
the generally low emphasis on identifying individuals with
specific analytical experience/skills for placement in
analysis related billets. Of particular note, not one single
respondent mentioned assignment to a MAFC or the Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity due to analyst skills or experience.
The Marine Corps certainly has any number of
experienced intelligence analysts both officer and enlisted.
However, since there is no subspecialty designator or other
means for tracking or identifying such personnel, it is
impossible to quantify this number. Most "analysts" are those
who have done several tours of intelligence duty, often
including a joint analyst assignment. However, these
experienced "analysts" seldom continue to work in analyst
specific billets, particularly in FMF assignments. When
queried in the survey, over 75 percent of the respondents
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, "Within
the Marine Corps intelligence field, our more experienced
personnel (officers) generally work in analysis billets." The
same statement regarding enlisted intelligence specialists had
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just over half disagree or strongly disagree. While this
indicates that the Marine Corps at least appears to do a
better job of capitalizing on enlisted analyst expertise and
experience, it still reflects a migration of experience away
from analyst specific billets and duties. When asked to
comment on where our more experienced personnel tend to be
assigned, the answers for officers included: external
billets; primary intelligence officer billets (unit intel
officers, i.e., G-2, S-2); and other higher echelon billets
such as G-2 operations officers and collections officers. For
enlisted personnel, the comments included: "B" billets
(recruiting, drill instructor, etc.); various G-2
administrative billets, and other senior positions like G-2
operations chiefs or unit intelligence chiefs. This is not a
phenomena unique to the intelligence MOS, however, it does
seriously erode the amount of skill and talent available for
assignment to specific analyst billets.
As a case in point, the author volunteered for
assignment to the 2d MAFC so the Marine Corps could capitalize
on his experience as an all-source fusion analyst at
Headquarters U.S. European Command. As a senior Captain
expecting to fill a billet as a senior analyst in the MAFC,
within weeks of his assignment he was designated as the MAFC
Of f icer-in-Charge (OIC) , a Lieutenant Colonel billet. The
MAFC T/0 for officers calls for a Lieutenant Colonel OIC,
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three Majors, five Captains, two Lieutenants, and a Warrant
Officer. For the Marine Corps intelligence field, this fairly
heavy rank structure distribution reflects the requirement for
experienced officers in this organization. Unfortunately, the
2d MAFC has never had more than one Major assigned at a time
and with the exception of the author and one other Captain,
has not had an officer assigned to it coming from a previous
specific analyst assignment. In the summer of 1992, the 2d
MAFC had a new lateral move Captain and two first lieutenants
as the senior officer analysts, and two second lieutenants
assigned, one just out of intelligence school and one waiting
to attend MOS school
.
Although the specific examples differ between the
three MAFCs, the instances cited here are not unique to the 2d
MAFC. In general, the overall experience level of officers
assigned to the MAFCs has not been appropriate for the duties
and responsibilities required by the billets within these
organizations. For example, in the 1st MAFCs most recent
deployment in support of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, of
the four 02 02 's who served there in the MAFC, three had
graduated from NMITC less than eight months before, and the
other one had less than two years experience in the
intelligence field.
Earlier, the assignment of foreign area officers was
discussed and the survey consensus was that more FAOs assigned
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to analyst billets would improve all-source fusion analysis
capabilities. There are no hard requirements to code any
specific intelligence analysis billets in the Marine Corps for
fill by FAOs . The Marine Corps Foreign Area Officer Program
Order identifies numerous FMF billets, including "Intelligence
Analysts, MAFC, SRIG, " as appropriate FAO billets. The
problem is that no specific billets are identified in any
formal manner which would steer the assignments monitors to
fill any particular billet or even particular SRIG (which is
the lowest monitor command code to which analysts/FAO' s would
be generically assigned) with a particular type FAO.
While there is an acknowledged need for all-source
fusion analysts and area expertise in the MAFCs, neither an
intelligence nor nonintelligence officer FAO have been
assigned to the 2d MAFC. The author is unaware if any FAO's
have been assigned to the 3d MAFC. The 1st MAFC has fared
somewhat better with several intelligence officer FAOs
assigned since its activation. During Desert Storm, the 1st
MAFCs senior analyst was an intelligence officer Arabic FAO
who "could stand before the assembled general officers and
accurately state that the enemy had no fire in the belly, and
his infantry and artillery would put up little resistance when
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closed with by U.S. Marines." 114 This example alone supports
a conclusion that appropriate numbers and types of FAO's must
be assigned to MAFCs to provide the much needed area expertise
which is necessary to fully optimize all-source fusion
analysis
.
Another factor which affects analyst area familiarity
is the Marine Corps' "career progression" assignment track.
Certain combinations of different types of duty and formal
professional military education is generally needed to be
"competitive" for promotion. Back-to-back analyst billets
would not necessarily be the right "combination" to show the
individual's breadth of abilities. Although the first
priority for the individuals concerned should be keeping them
competitive for promotion, this overriding concern dilutes the
possibilities of creating a core of very experienced analysts
who could then be assigned to organizations like the MCIA and
the MAFCs. Intelligence personnel coming out of joint or
other external analyst assignments are ideal candidates for
these same Marine Corps organizations, and should be assigned
to those billets with the same regional focus. At a minimum,
the Marine Corps should consider trying to assign intelligence
personnel to various commands and billets that cover the same
:4Decker, 23. Both then Captain Decker and the author
served with the senior analyst FAO during Desert Storm, and
his FAO expertise and insight were indeed invaluable to the I
MEF G-2 analytical effort.
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general part of the world. Survey respondents supported this
proposition with nearly eight out of ten agreeing or strongly
agreeing with the statement, "A career pattern that dictated
assignments to units at all echelons but that predominantly
kept the intelligence officer looking at the same general
region of the world would enhance regional expertise and
significantly improve all-source fusion analysis
capabilities .
"
The last major assignment related factor which affects
all-source fusion is billet assignment versus experience
level. A good example can once again be drawn from the MAFC
experience, although similar situations exist in other
intelligence sections/organizations. When an officer reports
to an intelligence organization, he is placed in a billet
commensurate first and foremost with his rank, and then if
there is any flexibility, by his experience. Officers
assigned to organizations like the MAFCs with little or no
regard to their overall intelligence experience or their
analytical experience, can have a disruptive effect on the
organization. There has been a tendency to assign very junior
officers, many of whom are reporting to their first FMF
assignment or who have just lateral moved into the
intelligence field, to the various MAFCs. This would present
difficulties for mature intelligence organizations staffed
with numerous other experienced intelligence officers, let
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alone to relatively new organizations trying to establish an
all-source fusion analysis capability like the three Marine
Corps MAFCs
.
Given that the manning priorities for experienced
intelligence officers favor joint/external billets followed by
the priority commands (including the MEUs) , it is not
surprising there is an experience deficit in the FMF in
general, and in the MAFCs specifically. Furthermore, given
the FMF manning levels of around 50 percent, those few
experienced intelligence officers assigned there gravitate
toward key billets other than analyst billets.
3. Personnel Continuity/Assignment Length
Besides the screening and selection' criteria for
external intelligence billets, another unique situation with
external billets is that they are, with very few exceptions,
three year tours--a decided benefit for anyone filling an
analyst billet. In the FMF, if Marines stay at one location
for a full three year assignment, they seldom stay in the same
billet assignment for all three years. This "movement" hurts
all-source fusion analysts. Analysts need time to develop
specific functional area familiarity (air order of battle,
ground order of battle, missile order of battle, etc.) as well
as regional familiarity in the focus of their particular
billet.
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Survey respondents indicated by a wide margin, just
how important personnel continuity is to analysis efforts.
When asked, "How important is personnel continuity to an
intelligence organization's ability to conduct anything other
than superficial analysis?", 51 percent said extremely
important, 33 percent said very important, and 11 percent said
important. Only 2.7 percent said not very important. The
respondents also indicated how long they thought minimum tour
lengths should be for full time analysts. 83 percent said
three years or longer, providing a strong consensus for three
year analyst tours in the FMF . However, the reality is that
most intelligence personnel serving in FMF analyst billets
serve less than two years in one billet. Nearly 80 percent of
the respondents said that in their experience, not counting
joint /external billets, the average analyst stays in the same
billet two or less years. Nearly 33 percent of the
respondents said one year or less. This kind of turnover is
extremely counterproductive to any all-source fusion analysis
effort.
Unfortunately, this kind of turnover is not just at
the "trench level" in all-source fusion organizations. The 2d
MAFC had five different OICs in the three years from 1989-
1992, and the 1st MAFC had four different OICs from 1991-1992.
Of final note, higher echelon DoD intelligence
organizations, including all unified command J-2 sections,
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have long realized the importance of personnel continuity in
various critical billets. Many of the billets considered
critical are the analyst billets in these various
organizations. The Marine Corps has likewise come to that
conclusion, at least in respect to the Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity. The Marine Corps Intelligence Roadmap
acknowledges
:
Civilians within the General Defense Intelligence Program
(GDIP) are employed in critical intelligence positions on
Headquarters Marine Corps, MARFOR Headquarters, and other
major staffs. These civilians provide valuable stability
and continuity. Of special note, the majority of the
Marine Corps' GDIP-funded civilians are employed as the
backbone of our expanding capability at the MCIA (NMIC)
and its Quantico detachment. 115
With personnel continuity so important at these echelons, how
can it not be just as important or more important at the
organizations created to conduct operational and tactical
level all-source fusion analysis?
C. IMPACT OF CURRENT MANNING INITIATIVES
A number of initiatives are underway in the Marine Corps
to correct the overall intelligence officer manning
deficiencies. Among these are the Additional Primary Military
Occupational Specialty (APMOS) Program and Basic School
Accessions. Additionally, the Marine Corps continues to
""Intelligence Roadmap," 10
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lateral move officers, primarily from the overmanned combat
arms MOS ' s to undermanned fields such as intelligence. Each
of these methods, while welcome as means to increase the raw
numbers of intelligence officers, present problems if the
officers are not carefully screened before they come into the
intelligence field (as noted above) , and if they are
inappropriately assigned.
In all three programs mentioned above, these new officers
are almost without exception assigned to FMF billets.
Unfortunately, too many of these officers are showing up in
the MAFCs . There appears to be a perception that more
intelligence officers in an organization like the MAFC is
better. That is only true if the officers are experienced.
The MAFCs, already undermanned, suffer an additional burden is
when brand new 0202 's or 0231 's show up in any great number.
In the case of the 2d MAFC, at times, over one third of the
personnel assigned were in their first intelligence billet.
A combination of inexperienced enlisted personnel and
inexperienced officers strains the organization's ability to
accomplish its mission. If the MAFCs were manned at 80
percent of T/O or higher, some few new personnel to the MOS
could be assimilated. A disproportionate amount of time and
organizational energy is spent on the first intelligence
assignment minorities. However, the MAFCs could be a good
experience for limited numbers of first intelligence
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assignment Marines if the entire organization is adequately-
manned overall, and manned with some of our more experienced
analysts
.
Assigning Second Lieutenants to MAFCs, unless they are
prior enlisted intelligence specialists, makes the "numbers"
look good, but does nothing to enhance the all-source fusion
capability of the organizations.
In some ways, assigning lateral move officers to the MAFCs
presents even more of a problem. The officer, by virtue of
rank (usually senior First Lieutenants or Captains) , often
fills a supervisory analytical billet. This is also a strain
on the organization, both for the officer involved and for the
junior officer and enlisted analysts who work under that
officer
.
Although uncertain if any APMOS officers have yet been
assigned to analyst billets in the MAFCs, this would be even
more problematic. There are many unique MAGTF intelligence
requirements, both descriptive and predictive in nature, to
which an officer who has only attended the Army intelligence
course at Fort Huachuca will not have been exposed--not the
least of which include fixed wing air intelligence and
amphibious intelligence. The other problem associated with
APMOS intelligence officers is that they will face an uphill
battle learning their jobs OJT. When the survey respondents
were asked, "In general, with no previous regional expertise
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or analytical background, how long do you think it takes to
educate, train, and through experience, develop a good,
qualified all-source analyst (not counting civilian
education)?", only 11 percent said less than one year; 37
percent said 1-2 years; 24 percent said 2-3 years; 17 percent
said 3-5 years; and 9 percent said five or more years. Again,
depending on the selectivity and screening criteria for those
selected for the APMOS program, one three year tour in an
intelligence analysis billet, is unlikely to benefit the
Marine Corps' all-source fusion analytical capability. At
least Second Lieutenant accessions and lateral moves present
the opportunity to generate a longer term benefit.
D. MORE DEMAND THAN SUPPLY
There is much more demand for experienced intelligence
analysts than there is supply. Despite the manning
initiatives to put more officers into the intelligence field,
at least in the short term, the critical short supply of
experienced intelligence officers with specific all-source
fusion analysis skills will not be alleviated soon. Given the
shortages will continue, the Marine Corps must take a hard
look at where these experienced officers need to be assigned
to take maximum advantage of their experience.
The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity will continue to
expand its all-source fusion capabilities, by continuing as a
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priority command for Marine assignment fills, together with
additional projected GDIP funded analyst billets in the coming
years. MEUs will continue to receive some of the very best
and most experienced officer and enlisted intelligence
personnel because they are at the "pointy tip of the spear."
However, if operational and tactical all-source fusion
analysis is to be enhanced, more experienced personnel need to
first be assigned to the MEF level MAFCs, and if at possible,
to the Divisions and Wings. If the concept of centralized
all-source fusion support at the MEF level is validated in the
current intelligence review, then the MAFCs must start to
receive not only more personnel, but the right personnel--
those with specific all-source fusion analysis experience.
Today, as many of the survey respondents pointed out, the best
place to get true all-source fusion experience is in joint
analyst billets. The first action the Marine Corps should
take, is to make a concerted effort to take advantage of
personnel coming out of these joint analyst billets by placing
them in the MAFCs. This is probably the fastest way to get
the MAFCs back on track to becoming viable all-source fusion
organizations. Even with manning shortages, the right people
with the right experience levels filling 50 percent of the
MAFC billets would go a long way to enhancing operational and
tactical all-source fusion capabilities. This would pay
dividends not only for support to Marines, but when the MAFCs
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are involved in providing joint all-source fusion analysis
support. Then, a high percentage of analysts with previous
joint experience would prove particularly invaluable.
The Marine Corps is reviewing all external intelligence
billets and revalidating the requirements. As mentioned
earlier, the prognosis is for even greater demands for more
external billets, including analysts, as the various JICs take
form and attempt to expand their capabilities to provide "one
stop shop" all-source fused intelligence support to
operational commanders. The Marine Corps must make some
extremely hard decisions regarding where the focus of effort
needs to be when it comes to assigning the limited number of
experienced analysts that we have. Once again, the survey
respondents' opinions were solicited. When asked, "Scenario
independent, with a limited number of experienced analysts at
any time in Marine Corps Intelligence and all other things
being equal, where do we get more bang for the buck (advantage
to Marines at the pointy tip of the spear) in their
assignment?", and allowed to select more than one response,
Theater level was the number one response marked by 50 percent
of the respondents. Next was MEF level (including MAFC) with
48 percent, followed by MEU level with 3 5 percent. Next was.
Division/Wing level with 22 percent, followed by National
level with 14 percent. Somewhat surprisingly, Service level
was only marked by 9 percent, behind even Battalion/ Squadron
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level with 11 percent. Given these opinions, other than the
Joint level which are already "excepted" commands, the next
manning priority for experienced analysts should be the
MEF/MAFC, which unfortunately is a "proportionate share"
command, followed by the MEUs and eventually the MCIA, both
"priority" commands.
To enhance all-source fusion analysis capabilities, the
Marine Corps must become more discriminatory in its initial
assignment criteria for 0202 's and 0231 's. Also, a much
better effort needs to be made to take advantage of those with
particular analytical or regional experience, by assigning
them to key analysis billets. The first priority for such
personnel should be the MAFCs . Personnel turbulence in all-
source fusion organizations must be minimized with such
billets designated as hard three year tours or even four year
tours. If these type steps cannot be taken, no greater amount
of personnel through manning initiatives alone will make a
significant difference. A MAFC manned at 100 percent with
largely inexperienced personnel is more detrimental to the
all-source fusion effort than a MAFC manned at 33 percent, but
with all those personnel being experienced analysts. The
Marine Corps must come to the realization that not everyone
can be an analyst. Until that happens, and those with actual
aptitude and experience are identified and earmarked, one, for
successive analyst assignments, and two, for successive
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assignments covering the same general areas of the world, all
source fusion analysis will continue to suffer.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In Vietnam, Beirut, Desert Storm, and many other
operational commitments, Marine Corps intelligence learned the
value of all-source fusion analysis. Despite those lessons,
all-source, fused, tailored intelligence, particularly at the
operational/tactical level, remains a Marine Corps objective,
but not a reality. All-source fusion and tailoring of
intelligence are much more complex concepts and processes than
most people understand. The efficient and accurate processing
of raw information is too often more than enough challenge for
the Marines engaged in all-source fusion analysis and
production; let alone filtering, fusing, and tailoring timely,
pertinent, usable, information into intelligence needed by
commanders, other Marines, and increasingly, joint operating
forces
.
Three primary areas significantly impede Marine Corps
capabilities to produce all-source, fused, tailored
intelligence: structure, organization, and manning combined;
training and education; and experience level and assignments.
The Marine Corps decision in the late 1980s, to create
organizations and structure to focus all-source fusion
intelligence analysis at two levels has paid partial
dividends. Commandant Alfred M. Gray's vision for a service
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level all-source fusion center has largely been realized with
the establishment and continued growth of the Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity. This organization, thanks to resource
investment and civilian analyst billets--a reflection of the
Marine Corps' priorities--has developed a capability to
accomplish its mission and tasks.
Unfortunately, the MCIA is not in a position, physically
or within an operational chain of command, to provide direct
all-source fused, tailored intelligence to deployed Marine
forces. While the MCIA continues to expand both in terms of
personnel and capability, it remains focused primarily on
service level intelligence support. With evolving DoD joint
intelligence architecture placing the responsibility for
operational intelligence support, including all-source fused
intelligence analysis and production, at the respective
unified command Joint Intelligence Centers, service level
intelligence organizations are no longer focusing on
operational intelligence support to deployed forces.
This leaves the MAFCs, specifically created to serve this
operational intelligence function, as the organizations of
choice to accomplish all-source fusion intelligence analysis
support for Marine operating forces. Unfortunately, the
Marine Corps has not made the proper investment in these
organizations in terms of manning--both in numbers and in
quality and experience level of the personnel assigned. This
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has been, and continues to be, the most significant reason why
all-source fused, tailored, intelligence has not been produced
by Marines for Marines in the quantity and quality desired or
expected. The prognosis for increased manning in the FMF is
not good, given overall Marine Corps downsizing and the
increasing demands for additional intelligence personnel to
man various expanding joint intelligence organizations. The
Marine Corps must decide where the best return on its
investment will be, relative to manning higher priority
external/joint billets or the lower priority FMF billets.
The structure/billets taken from the major subordinate
commands to create the MAFCs has seriously diminished what
all-source fusion capabilities previously existed at those
organizations, while not providing significant increases in
all-source fusion support back to those commands from the
MEF/MAFC. Without increased intelligence structure and
manning of that structure across the board, Marine Corps all-
source fusion analysis efforts will continue to remain just a
goal
.
The Battle Roster program of providing large numbers of
augmenters to the MEF G-2/MAFC is not conducive to all-source
fusion analysis efforts. The existing difficulty of providing
all-source fusion analysis, plagued by chronic personnel
shortages, is often exacerbated by the influx of other
relatively unknown personnel at the last minute in a
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developing or actual crisis. The all-source fusion analysis
team must be largely formed and trained together over time, to
even begin to maximize the cumulative potential of the various
analysts
.
With or without additional manning and structure, the
Marine Corps must do a better job of training and educating
intelligence personnel in the art of intelligence analysis and
all-source fusion. All-source fusion intelligence analysis
must become the focus of all intelligence training. This
includes formal training at NMITC and better integration of
all-source information and intelligence in on-the-job
training. Increased data and information connectivity and
access, facilitated by the fielding of the Joint Deployable
Intelligence Information System (JDIIS) and the Marine Corps'
Intelligence Analysis System, should support endeavors in this
regard. However, all-source fusion training must be
continuous and realistic, both in garrison and in exercises.
Marine intelligence personnel must train the way they are
expected to "fight." If real intelligence analysis and all-
source fusion is not demanded in CPXs and FTXs , then there is
no reason to expect intelligence analysts to be able to
"analyze" huge volumes of information, separating wheat from
chaff, in actual crisis situations. Despite the short term
initiatives to alleviate intelligence officer personnel
shortages, continued shortages of experienced intelligence
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personnel assigned to the FMF will continue to dictate an
almost exclusive focus on processing combat information versus
production of finished intelligence reflecting well reasoned,
all-source, fused analysis. This, coupled with continued
unrealistic training, will virtually ensure that "analysts"
are not adequately prepared to accomplish true all-source
fusion intelligence analysis.
Area familiarity/expertise is absolutely necessary for
all-source fusion analysis efforts. The accurate and precise
interpretation of much of the information originating from a
crisis area/region is often only possible through the
perceptive understanding of an area "expert." The Marine
Corps needs to make a concerted effort to train and educate
more personnel with area expertise, and then strive to do a
better job of tracking and assigning these personnel to
locations and organizations where optimal use of their
expertise can be made.
Regarding assignments, there are not enough experienced
intelligence personnel working in analysis billets. An effort
must be made to identify key analyst billets within the Marine
Corps, starting with the MAFCs . Then, better efforts must be
made to fill these billets with personnel specifically
experienced in all-source fusion analysis, as well as with
FAOs and/or other intelligence personnel with pertinent area
expertise/ familiarity . Only then will these organizations
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begin to approach their potential, and at the same time, begin
to serve as training grounds for other less experienced
analysts. Until this happens, the Marine Corps' reliance on
external/ joint billet assignments to achieve this kind of
experience will not be alleviated.
Finally, personnel assigned as analysts must also be
allowed to serve in those billets for longer periods of time.
Constant personnel turbulence is counterproductive to
developing and maintaining an all-source fusion analysis
capability. Minimum tours should be three years, with every
effort made to minimize specific billet turbulence within
organizations. This will allow analysts to "mature" in their
specific area responsibilities, and facilitate the all-source
fusion process .
Unfortunately, the problems identified in this thesis are
for the most part symptomatic of the many larger problems
facing Marine Corps intelligence in general. The Marine Corps
is painfully aware of the many deficiencies within the
intelligence field and is aggressively tackling the problems
head on. Many of these institutional intelligence
deficiencies have existed for years, and are now magnified
within the realities of Marine Corps downsizing. At the same
time, missions are expanding, commitments continue unabated,
and joint requirements are increasing the demands on our
limited intelligence capabilities.
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The Marine Corps has always prided itself on doing more
with less. This does not work when it comes to all-source
fusion analysis support to Marine and joint operating forces.
The Marine Corps must make a much greater investment in
people--in terms of numbers, training, and assignments--if
all-source fused, tailored, intelligence support by Marines
for Marines and joint operating forces is to be improved.
Without that investment, Marine Corps intelligence
organizations and personnel will continue to operate as they
have, and all-source, fused, tailored intelligence will remain
more a goal than a reality.
130
APPENDIX
1. Survey Questionnaire. The author designed this
questionnaire in an attempt to measure the opinions of his
fellow Marine Corps intelligence officers regarding the topic
of this thesis: All-Source Fusion and Analysis.
2. Questionnaire Administration. The author attempted to
send the survey questionnaire to the 340 Marine Corps
intelligence officers (0202 and 0205) between the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel and Warrant Officer on active duty in April
1993. 147 officers responded before the deadline of 21 May
1993, out of 310 officers believed to have received the survey
(30 were not deliverable at the addresses provided) . This was
a 47 percent response rate. The high response rate, and
overall tone and emotion in the respondents' many extensive
comments, reflects the high levels of concern on this specific
issue, and on the many broader issues which affect Marine
Corps Intelligence.
3. Questionnaire Results. The survey questions as
administered, follow, with the percentages of respondents'
marking the block (s) so indicated. If the question allowed
more than one block to be checked, then the percentages total
131
in that question will exceed 100 percent. In the other
questions requiring only one block to be checked, the
percentages will total nearly 100 percent, with any shortage
reflecting the percentage who chose not to respond at all to
that question (the author chose not to invalidate
questionnaires in which every question was not answered)
.
There were extensive comments and the author tried to capture
the essence of some of them in the body of the thesis. The
percentages which appear are from the entire 147 who
responded. Although not reflected herein, the author recorded
the responses by field grade (Majors and Lieutenant Colonels)
and company grade (Warrant Officer to Captain) , as well as by
type of current duty (Joint/External billet; Marine Corps Non-
FMF billet; and Marine Corps FMF billet) . There were no
apparent trends reflecting any major differences of opinion
based on either rank or current duty in any of the questions.
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QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY
Please read through entire questionnaire once before answering questions.
Please feel free to make comments in the margins if space has not been allowed.
1. Your Name/Rank:
2. Your Primary/Additional MOS's:
3. Prior enlisted experience (years and MOS):
Name and address of Present Command:4.
5. Next command and billet (if under orders):
Your current billet title:6.
7. Brief description of your duties:






Years in intelligence field:
. Lateral Move? No Yes Year?






13 . Previous Intelligence Formal Training/Education (include course name,
location, and dates):
Foreign Aiea Officer (FAO) ?
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14. Overall, how adequately do you feel we accomplish all-source fused intelligence analysis
in the Marine Corps?
( 0%) extremely adequately
( 3%) very adequately
(25%) adequately
(40%) somewhat adequately
(27%) not very adequately
15. Overall, what do you think most inhibits our ability to best do "all-source fused" intelligence
analysis? (Please rank order choices provided 1-6 or N/A if you believe nonapplicable)
( 2 ) Structural Impediments (inadequate T/O's; wrong intel structure in
Marine Corps; too much reliance on other echelons both internal and
external to Marine Corps)
( 1 ) Manning Levels (faces for places)
( 4 ) Training and Education (includes formal schools and regular MOS)
( 3 ) Experience Level/Assignment Policy (right faces in right places)
( 6 ) Operational and "Other" Focus/Commitments (dilation of effort)
( 5 ) Connectivity/Access to All-Source Data/Information/Intelligence
( ) Other. Please Specify:
Tell where between 1-6 above you would place this choice (or choices).
16. With the current intelligence structure and manning, true, all-source fused intelligence
analysis is accomplished at what level(s)?
(37%) Service level (Marine Corps Intelligence Activity)
(23%) Force level (FMFLANT/FMFPAC)
(65%) MEF level (MAFC's/G-2 Analysis and Production Section)
(16%) Div/Wing/FSSG level (check and circle each as appropriate)
(42%) MEU level
( 6%) Regt/Group level
( 5%) Bn/Sqdn level
134





(43%) Div/Wing/FSSG level (check and circle each as appropriate)
(59%) MEU level
(12%) Regt/ Group level
( 8%) Bn/Sqdn level
18. Have any of the recent past/current intelligence reorganization initiatives increased the level
of all-source fused intelligence support your unit/echelon (current or past) has received?
(10%) NMJIC (National Military Joint Intelligence Center)
(35%) Theater JlC's (AIC, JICPAC, JAC, etc.; if so specify below)
(14%) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (old Marine Corps Intel Center)
( 9%) Other Service Intelligence Organizations (if so specify below)
(18%) MAGTF All-Source Fusion Centers
(11%) Not Applicable
(33%) Not Apparent
Specific organization and type(s) product(s):
19. The creation of the MAGTF All-Source Fusion Centers at each SRIG was overall a positive








20. The recent emphasis on Joint Intelligence Centers at the Theater and Joint Task Force levels
as the focal point for all-source fusion/"one stop shop" intelligence support for operating forces







21. If every billet was filled by a qualified individual, there is adequate structure (billets) at your






( 3%) No opinion
(16%) Not applicable
22. Personnel augmentation (regular or reserves) to fill empty line numbers immediately prior
to major exercises or actual developing crisis situations enhances ability to conduct all-source
fused intelligence analysis.
Advance augmentation to really be useful should be:
(44%) more than one month
(30%) one month
( 3%) three weeks
(11%) two weeks
(2%) one week












23. All-source fused intelligence support to Marine forces would be improved if manning





( 9%) Strongly disagree
( 7%) No opinion
( 1%) Not applicable
24. The Marine Corps' new battle roster concept of taking personnel from primarily non-FMF
units to flush out T/O line numbers for deploying MEF and Component Command Headquarters






( 8%) No Opinion
Comments:
25. Have you ever been assigned to a permanent or temporary intelligence billet because of any
unique characteristic/experience related to specific analytical experience expertise, training, or
education (including foreign language capability)? Yes 31% No 64%
If yes, where and why?
Comments:
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26. Within the Marine Corps Intelligence field, our more experienced personnel generally work
in analysis billets.
OFFICER ENLISTED
( 1%) Strongly agree ( 3%) Strongly agree
(12%) Agree (27%) Agree
(57%) Disagree (39%) Disagree
(19%) Strongly disagree (15%) Strongly disagree
(10%) No opinion (14%) No Opinion
If not, where do they tend to be assigned?
27. More officers trained in the FAO program assigned to specifically coded intelligence analysis
billets would enhance our abilities relative to all-source intelligence analysis.
Intel Officers Trained & Assigned Non-Intel Officers Trained & Assigned
(42%) Strongly agree (17%) Strongly agree
(40%) Agree (48%) Agree
(7%) Disagree (14%) Disagree
( 1%) Strongly disagree ( 8%) Strongly disagree
( 9%) No opinion (12%) No opinion
28. A career pattern that dictated assignments to units at all echelons but that predominantly kept
the intelligence officer looking at the same general region of the world would enhance regional




( 5%) Strongly disagree
( 4%) No opinion
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29. Scenario independent, with a limited number of experienced analysts at any time in Marine
Corps Intelligence and all other things being equal, where do we get more bang for the buck
(advantage to Marines at the pointy tip of the sword) in their assignment?
(14%) National level intelligence organizations
( 9%) Service level intelligence organizations
(50%) Theater level intelligence organizations (JlCs, including JTF's)
( 5%) Separate Component Command level intelligence organizations
(48%) MEF level intelligence organizations (including MAFC)




30. In general, with no previous regional expertise or analytical background, how long do you
think it takes to educate, train, and through experience, develop a good, qualified all-source
analyst (do not count civilian education)?




( 9%) five or more years
31. Other than any specific analysis courses already listed, what general or specific analytical
training or education have you received (that directly contributes to your abilities as an analyst)?
Any you would specifically recommend?
32. As an occupational field, how well do we provide on the job training for 0202 's and 0231 's
relative to all-source fusion and analysis?
( 0%) Extremely well
( 2%) Very well
(16%) Adequately
(49%) Not very well
(32%) Poorly
( 2%) No opinion
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33. During CPX's and field exercises, how often is realistic all-source fusion







34. In your overall experience, how significantly does over commitment/tasking of you and/or




(12%) Not very significantly
( 3%) Not at all
Comment:
35. How often are "other priorities" dictated that seriously impede the day-to-day analytical
effort?
Garrison Field/Exercise Crisis Commitment
(40%) Very often ( 6%) Very often ( 8%) Very often
(40%) Often (31%) Often (10%) Often
(10%) Sometimes (39%) Sometimes (28%) Sometimes
(4%) Seldom (17%) Seldom (40%) Seldom
( 1%) Never ( 1%) Never ( 5%) Never






37. How important is personnel continuity to an intelligence organization's ability to conduct
anything other than superficial analysis?
Overall tour length Impact of FAP/TAD/Guard/Etc.
(51%) Extremely important (34%) Extremely important
(33%) Very important (28%) Very important
(11%) Important (22%) Important
( 3%) Not particularly important (10%) Not particularly important
( 0%) Not important ( 1%) Not important
38. Minimum tour lengths for full time analysts should be:
(18%) 4 or more years (14%) 2 years
(38%) 3-4 years ( 0%) 1-2 years
(27%) 3 years (1%) No minimum
39. In your experience, not counting joint/external billets, how long does the average analyst stay
in one billet?
40. In your current billet, ready, day-to-day access to wide sources of unclassified, open source
dataAnformation is: (including unit intel libraries, FBIS, CNN, newspaper and periodical
subscriptions, think tank publications, on-line news service, etc.)
(33%) Extremely good (11%) Fair
(20%) Very good ( 8%) Poor
(10%) Good ( 3%) Unsatisfactory
( 8%) Adequate ( 5%) Not applicable
Comments:
41. In your current billet, convenient, day-to-day access to relevant GENSER data, information,
and intelligence products is: (including hard/soft copy products, classified library, intelligence
related message traffic, local and online intelligence databases, etc.)
(33%) Extremely good (11%) Fair
(20%) Very good ( 8%) Poor
(10%) Good ( 3%) Unsatisfactory
( 8%) Adequate ( 5%) Not applicable
Comments ( unclassified only):
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43. Information overload is a problem in the following environments:
Garrison Field/Exercise Crisis Commitment
(2%) Very often ( 6%) Very often (36%) Very often
(11%) Often (17%) Often (33%) Often
(25%) Sometimes (38%) Sometimes (13%) Sometimes
(43%) Seldom (26%) Seldom (8%) Seldom
(12%) Never ( 9%) Never (5%) Never




(23%) Agree ( ) Very familiar
(26%) Generally agree ( ) Familiar
( 9%) Disagree ( ) Slightly familiar
( 3%) Strongly disagree ( ) Unfamiliar
(23%) No opinion
Comments:
45. Current Marine Corps intelligence automation/systems emphasis and initiatives have freed














46. How important is analyst familiarity with single source reporting (DIRNSA, NPIC,
AMEMBASSY, USDAO, etc.) in day-to-day garrison work to develop the skills necessary to




(3%) Not very important
( 0%) Not important at all
( 3%) No opinion
47. Do you encounter difficulties getting on distribution for the type reporting you feel you need
and can handle at your echelon? Yes 43% No 50%
Comments:
48. The following inhibits effectively integrating SCI material into overall Marine Corps "all-
source" analytical capabilities:












( 2%) No opinion
Comments:
ANY OTHER ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
Would you be willing to be contacted telephonically for follow up questions?
(All comments will remain non-attributable in my report!) Thank You.
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